

# Model Driven Security: From UML Models to Access Control Infrastructures

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We present a new approach to building secure systems. In our approach, which we call Model Driven Security, designers specify system models along with their security requirements and use tools to automatically generate system architectures from the models, including complete, configured access control infrastructures. Rather than fixing one particular modeling language for this process, we propose a general schema for constructing such languages that combines languages for modeling systems with languages for modeling security. We present several instances of this schema that combine (both syntactically and semantically) different UML modeling languages with a security modeling language for formalizing access control requirements. From models in the combined languages, we automatically generate access control infrastructures for server-based applications, built from declarative and programmatic access control mechanisms. The modeling languages and generation process are semantically well-founded and are based on an extension of Role-Based Access Control. We have implemented this approach in a UML-based CASE-tool and report on experiments.

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


Fig. 1. Model Driven Architecture.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Model building is standard practice in software engineering. The construction of models during requirements analysis and system design can improve the quality of the resulting systems by providing a foundation for early analysis and fault detection. The models also serve as specifications for the later development phases and, when the models are sufficiently formal, they can provide a basis for refinement down to code.

Model building is also carried out in security modeling and policy specification. However, its integration into the overall development process is problematic and suffers from two gaps. First, security models and system design models are typically disjoint and expressed in different ways (e.g., security models as structured text versus graphical design models in languages like UML). In general, the integration of system design models with security models is poorly understood and inadequately supported by modern software development processes and tools. Second, although security requirements and threats are often considered during the early development phases (requirements analysis), and security mechanisms are later employed in the final development phases (system integration and test), there is a gap in the middle. As a result, security is typically integrated into systems in a post hoc manner, which degrades the security and maintainability of the resulting systems.

In this article, we take up the challenge of providing languages, methods, and tools for bridging these gaps. Our starting point is the concept of *Model Driven Architecture* (MDA) [Frankel 2003], which has been proposed as a means for supporting the software development process by employing a model-centric and generative approach. As Figure 1 suggests, the MDA approach has three parts: developers create (1) system models in high level modeling languages like UML; tools are used to perform (2) automatic model transformation; and the result is (3) a target (system) architecture. Whereas the generation of simple kinds of code skeletons by CASE-tools is now standard (e.g., generating class hierarchies from class diagrams), Model Driven Architecture is more ambitious and aims at generating nontrivial kinds of system infrastructure from models.




Fig. 2. Model Driven Security.

Examples include the generation of distributable components from class diagrams, including database access and transaction management, or the generation of controllers from state machine models.

Our main contribution is to show how the Model Driven Architecture approach can be specialized to what we call *Model Driven Security*. In this approach, general purpose modeling languages and transformation functions are extended by modeling primitives and generation rules for integrating security into the development process. These measures are used to specify security properties of the target system and to generate corresponding security mechanisms. We illustrate the principles of Model Driven Security on the example of access control, namely role-based access control. As suggested by Figure 2, we specialize the three parts of MDA to model access control requirements and generate access control infrastructures. The most difficult part of this specialization concerns the first part, and here we propose a general schema for integrating access control requirements into system design models. The main idea is to define security modeling languages that are general in that they leave open the nature of the protected resources, whether these resources are data, business objects, processes, states in a controller, and so on. Such a security modeling language can then be combined with a system design modeling language by defining a *dialect*, which identifies elements of the design language as the protected resources of the security language. In this way, we can define families of languages that flexibly combine design modeling languages and security modeling languages, and are capable of formulating system designs along with their access control requirements.

To show the feasibility of this approach and to illustrate some of the design issues, we present several detailed examples. First, we specify a security modeling language for modeling access control requirements that generalizes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]. To support visual modeling, we embed this language within an extension of UML and hence we call the result *SecureUML*. Afterwards, we give two examples of design modeling languages, one based on class diagrams and the other based on statecharts. We

then combine each of these with SecureUML by defining dialects that identify particular elements of each design modeling language as protected SecureUML resources.

In each case, we define model transformations for the combined modeling language by augmenting model transformations for the UML-based modeling languages with the additional functionality necessary for translating our security modeling constructs. The first combination results in a language for modeling access control requirements for component-based systems; we define transformation functions that produce access control infrastructures for distributed systems conforming to the Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) standard or, alternatively, the Microsoft Enterprise Services for .NET. The second combination provides a language for modeling access control requirements for controllers for multi-tier architectures and the transformation function generates access control infrastructures for web applications. These translations are based on a set-theoretic semantics for our SecureUML extensions that maps, essentially, our extensions into a relational structure with constraints. Given a SecureUML dialect, this semantic information is then translated into an access control infrastructure; for instance, the relational structure is mapped into a configuration for declarative access control.

As a proof of concept, within the MDA-tool ArcStyler [Hubert 2001] we have built a prototypical generator that implements the above mentioned transformation functions for both dialects. We report on this, as well as on experience with our approach. Overall, we view the result as a large step towards integrating security engineering into a model-driven software development process. This bridges the gap between security analysis and the integration of access control mechanisms into end systems. Moreover, it integrates security models with system design models and thus yields a new kind of model, *security design models*.

The Model Driven Security approach that we propose offers additional advantages. First, it naturally gives rise to models that are technology independent, reusable, and evolvable. As the technology-specific details (e.g., application programming interfaces) are specified by the transformation functions, instead of by the models, architectures can be generated for (or evolved to) new technologies simply by changing these transformation functions. We illustrate this by giving two different transformation functions that translate models defined in the SecureUML dialect for distributed object systems to either EJB or .NET technology. Second, by integrating security and system design models, it is possible to model and generate “security aware” applications that only present options to the user that are consistent with the formalized security policy. Third, UML is a widely used language that developers are familiar with and many tools are available for processing UML models. Since our approach is based on UML-notation, both for defining modeling languages as well as for defining models, we expect a low acceptance barrier for our approach. Finally, we have focused on security and design modeling languages that can be given a formal semantics, both alone and in combination. This means that it is possible to formally analyze both the models and the transformation process. Although we do not investigate this here, it should be possible to carry out automatic

property checking of security design models to detect and correct design errors and even to verify the correctness of the model transformation process itself.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the running example used in this article and provide background on the Unified Modeling Language, Model Driven Architecture, Role-Based Access Control, and the security architectures of Enterprise JavaBeans, Enterprise Services for .NET, and Java Servlets. In Section 3 we give an overview of Model Driven Security and in Section 4 we present the syntax and semantics of SecureUML, our security modeling language for access control. We show how to combine SecureUML with a design modeling language for component-oriented systems in Section 5, and how to generate Enterprise JavaBeans access control infrastructures in Section 6 and .NET infrastructures in Section 7. To demonstrate the general applicability of our approach, in Section 8 we give a second example of integrating SecureUML with a design modeling language, this time for modeling the control flow of applications and generating a Java Servlet access control architecture. In Section 9 we discuss practical experience with our approach, evaluate its generality, and review related work. In Section 10 we draw conclusions and discuss future work.

## 2. BACKGROUND

We first introduce a design problem along with its security requirements that will serve as a running example throughout this article. Afterwards, we introduce the modeling and technological foundations that we build upon: the Unified Modeling Language, Model Driven Architecture, Role-based Access Control, and several security architectures.

### 2.1 A Design Problem

As a running example, we will consider developing a simplified version of a system for administrating meetings. The system should maintain a list of users (we will ignore issues such as user administration) and records of meetings. A meeting has an owner, a list of participants, a time, and a place. Users may carry out standard operations on meetings, such as creating, reading, editing, and deleting them. A user may also cancel a meeting, which deletes the meeting and notifies all participants by email.

As the article proceeds, we will see how to formalize a design model for this system along with the following (here informally given) security policy.

- (1) All users of the system are allowed to create new meetings and read all meeting entries.
- (2) Only the owner of a meeting is allowed to change meeting data and cancel or delete the meeting.
- (3) A supervisor is allowed to cancel any meeting.

We will later build models for this problem that will be automatically transformed into a system design for a multi-tier scheduling application along with a complete access control infrastructure.




Fig. 3. Scheduler application class diagram.

## 2.2 The Unified Modeling Language

The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [Rumbaugh et al. 1998] is a widely used graphical language for modeling object-oriented systems. The language specification differentiates between *abstract syntax* and *notation* (also called *concrete syntax*). The abstract syntax defines the language primitives used to build models, whereas the notation defines the graphical representation of these primitives as icons, strings, or figures. UML supports the description of the structure and behavior of systems using different model element types and corresponding diagram types. In this article, we focus on the model element types comprising class and statechart diagrams.

The structural aspects of systems are defined using classes, each class formalizing a set of objects with common services, properties, and behavior. Services are described by methods, and properties are described by attributes and associations. Every class participating in an association is connected to the association by an association end, which may also specify the role name of the class and its cardinality in the association. The behavior of a class can be characterized by other UML elements, such as a state machine that is attached to the class.

Classes are depicted in class diagrams as shown in Figure 3. This diagram shows the structure of our scheduling application. The model consists of three classes: Meeting, Person, and Room. A Meeting has attributes for storing the start date and the planned duration. The owner, participants, and the location of the meeting are specified using the association ends *owner*, *participants*, and *location*. The method *notify* notifies the participants of changes to the schedule. The method *cancel* cancels the meeting, which includes notifying the participants and canceling the room reservation.

In contrast, state machines describe the behavior of a system or a class in terms of states and events that cause a transition between states. A state machine is graphically represented by a statechart diagram. The rectangles and circles represent states and the arrows represent transitions. Transitions may be labeled with the name of the triggering event and (separated by a slash) the name of the action that is executed during the state transition.

Figure 4 shows the statechart diagram for our scheduling application. In the state *ListMeetings*, a user can browse the scheduled meetings and can initiate (e.g., by clicking a button in a graphical user interface) the editing, creation, deletion, and cancellation of meetings. An event of type *edit* causes a transition to the state *EditMeeting*, where the currently selected meeting (stored in




Fig. 4. Scheduler application statechart.

ListMeetings) is edited. An event of type `create` causes a transition to the state `CreateMeeting`, where a new meeting is created from data entered by the user. An event of type `delete` in the state `ListMeetings` triggers a transition that executes the action `deleteMeeting`, where the currently selected meeting is deleted from the database. Similarly, an event of type `cancel` causes the execution of `cancelMeeting`, which calls the method `cancel` on the selected meeting.

UML also provides a specification language, called the *Object Constraint Language* (OCL), which is based on first-order logic. OCL expressions are used to formalize invariants for classes, preconditions and postconditions for methods, and guards for enabling transitions in state machines. As an example, we can add the following OCL constraint to the class `Meeting` in Figure 3.

```

context Meeting inv:
  self.participants->includes(self.owner)
  
```

The constraint names a class, here `Meeting`, and defines an invariant of the class stating that the owner of a meeting must be contained in the set of participants. Each OCL expression is evaluated in the context of an instance of the named class, and the reserved symbol `self` refers to that instance. In our example, `self` represents an instance of the class `Meeting`. The attributes, association ends, and methods of an instance can be accessed either using “dot-notation” or using “arrow-notation” (in the case of operations on collections, as above). In the example, `participants` and `owner` denote the respective association ends of the meeting, and `includes` is a generic operation defined for arbitrary collections.

UML can serve as a foundation for building domain-specific languages. *Stereotypes* are used to introduce new language primitives by subtyping core UML types, and *tagged values*, which are pairs of *tags* and *values*, to formalize properties of these new primitives. Model elements are assigned to such types by labeling them with the corresponding stereotype. Additional restrictions on the syntax of the domain-specific language can be defined using OCL constraints. A set of such definitions constitutes a *UML profile*.

### 2.3 Model Driven Architecture

Model Driven Architecture (MDA) has been proposed as an approach to specifying and developing applications where systems are represented as models

and transformation functions are used to map between models as well as to automatically generate executable code [Frankel 2003]. Of course, the completely automatic synthesis of complex systems from high level descriptions is unobtainable in its full generality. We cannot, in general, automatically generate the functions implementing a specification of a system's functional behavior: its "business logic." But what is possible, is to automate the generation of platform-specific support for different kinds of nonfunctional system concerns, such as support for persistence, logging, and the like. These concerns are examples of system *aspects*, in the aspect-oriented programming sense [Kiczales et al. 1997], that cut across different system components. Our work shows that security, in particular access control, is one such aspect that can be automatically generated and that this brings with it many advantages.

The use of domain-specific languages is at the heart of MDA, for example, modeling languages capable of formalizing different business domains (like health care), system aspects (such as security), or concrete technologies (like Enterprise JavaBeans). In the context of UML modeling, there are three alternatives for defining such languages, which we discuss briefly here. First, domain-specific languages can be defined directly in UML in a lightweight way, using stereotypes and tagged values, as just explained in Section 2.2. Second, the Meta-Object Facility (MOF) [Object Management Group 2002] can be used to directly extend the UML metamodel (e.g., Frankel [2003]). MOF is essentially a subset of UML that is used to formalize metamodels<sup>1</sup> using standard object-oriented concepts like class and inheritance. A drawback of this approach is that the customized metamodel is then based on the entire UML metamodel, which is quite complex. Moreover, such a heavyweight extension may require one to extend the CASE-tool itself, in particular storage components (the repository) and the visualization components. The third alternative is to define new modeling languages directly using MOF, which focus on a particular problem or domain without any dependency on UML. The resulting language definitions usually have an intuitive domain-specific vocabulary that is much more concise than the vocabulary of UML-based languages. Moreover, the interfaces for querying and manipulating the metadata are simpler than a heavyweight UML interface. The concrete syntax of these modeling languages is then specified using a UML profile.

We have taken the third alternative, which turned out to work very well with our approach. MOF provides a more expressive formalism for defining modeling languages than lightweight UML extensions or conventional language definition techniques like the Backus-Naur Form (BNF). For example, in MOF, we can directly formalize relations between model primitives, which is one of the key ideas we use when combining modeling languages (e.g., see the discussion on subtyping in 5.1). MOF also offers advantages for building MDA tools. There is tool support for automatically creating repositories and maintaining

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<sup>1</sup>A *metamodel* is a model that describes a class of models. For instance, a model  $m_2$  can be the metamodel of another model  $m_1$ , which means that each *metaobject* (i.e., an element of a metamodel) in  $m_2$  is a description of types of objects in  $m_1$  and each object in  $m_1$  is an instance of a metaobject in  $m_2$ . In this way, metamodels specify the vocabulary that can be used to define other models.



metadata based on MOF, for example, Akehurst and Kent [2002]. Moreover, by separating the abstract syntax of modeling languages from their UML-based concrete syntax, we can define languages in a concise and uncluttered way and directly use UML CASE-tools for building models.

## 2.4 RBAC

Mathematically, access control requirements can, in many cases, be expressed as a relation  $AC$  between a set of *Users* and a set of *Permissions*:

$$AC \subseteq Users \times Permissions.$$

User  $u$  is granted permission  $p$  if and only if  $(u, p) \in AC$ . Aside from the technical question of how to integrate this relation into systems so that granting permissions respects this relation, a major challenge concerns how to effectively represent this information, since directly storing all the  $(u, p)$  pairs scales poorly. Moreover, this view is rather “flat” and does not support natural abstractions like sets of permissions.

*Role-Based Access Control*, or RBAC, addresses both of the above limitations. The core idea of RBAC is to introduce a set of roles and to decompose the relation  $AC$  into two relations: user assignment  $UA$  and permission assignment  $PA$ :

$$UA \subseteq Users \times Roles, \quad PA \subseteq Roles \times Permissions.$$

The access control relation is then simply the composition of these relations:

$$AC = PA \circ UA,$$

where the symbol “ $\circ$ ” denotes relational composition. In other words,  $AC$  is defined by

$$AC = \{(u, p) \in Users \times Permissions \mid \exists role \in Roles. (u, role) \in UA \wedge (role, p) \in PA\}.$$

To further reduce the size of these relations and support additional abstraction, RBAC also has a notion of hierarchy on roles. Mathematically, this is a partial order  $\geq$  on the set of roles, with the meaning that larger roles inherit permissions from all smaller roles. Formally, this means that the access control relation is now given by the equation

$$AC = PA \circ_{\geq} \circ UA,$$

where the role hierarchy relation  $\geq$  is also part of the composition. To express the same access control relation without a role hierarchy, one must, for example, assign each user additional roles—a user is then not just assigned his original roles, but also all smaller roles. Alternatively, one can give roles additional permissions—a role not only has its assigned permissions, but also all the permissions of smaller roles. The introduction of a hierarchy, like the decomposition of relations, leads to a more expressive formalism in the sense that one can express access control relations more concisely. Role hierarchies also simplify the administration of access control since they provide a convenient and intuitive abstraction that can correspond to the actual organizational structure of companies.

We have chosen RBAC as a foundation of our security modeling language because it is well established and it is supported by many existing technology platforms, which simplifies the subsequent definition of the transformation functions. However, RBAC also has limitations. For example, it is difficult to formalize access control policies that depend on dynamic aspects of the system, like the date or the values of system or method parameters. We have extended RBAC with authorization constraints to overcome this limitation. Furthermore, although many technologies support RBAC, they differ in details, like the degree of support for role hierarchies and the types of protected resources. As we will see later, our approach of generating architectures from models provides a means to overcome such limitations and differences in technologies.

## 2.5 Security Architectures

We use the security mechanisms of three different target platforms in this article. We provide an overview of these architectures here, focusing on their support for access control.

*Enterprise JavaBeans.* Enterprise JavaBeans (EJBs) is a component architecture standard [Monson-Haefel 2001] for developing server-side components in Java. These components usually form the business logic of multi-tier applications and run on application servers. The standard specifies infrastructures for system level aspects such as transactions, persistence, and security. To use these, an EJB developer declares properties for these aspects, which are managed by the application server. This configuration information is stored in *deployment descriptors*, which are XML documents that are installed together with the components.

EJB differentiates between three types of components: entity beans, session beans, and message-driven beans. We will focus on the first type of components, which represent persistent business objects. The core of an EJB entity component is the *bean class*, which contains the business logic of the component. An entity component may have up to four interfaces, which can be categorized along two dimensions. First, there are *home* and *component interfaces*. Home interfaces are used, for example, to create and find bean instances, whereas component interfaces define the methods applicable to the component instances. Second, such an interface can either be a *remote* or a *local* interface. Remote interfaces can be accessed from outside the application server process, whereas local interfaces are only accessible within the Java virtual machine where the component resides.

The access control model<sup>2</sup> of EJB is based on RBAC, where the protected resources are the methods accessed using the interfaces of an EJB. This provides a mechanism for *declarative access control* where the access control policy is configured in the deployment descriptors of an EJB component. The security

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<sup>2</sup>Note that the usage of the term *model* in the security community is analogous to the usage of *metamodel* as in Section 2.3. The access control model describes the language for formulating access control policies.

subsystem of the EJB application server is then responsible for enforcing this policy on behalf of the components. The following example shows the definition of a permission that authorizes the role Supervisor to execute the method cancel on the component Meeting.

```
<method-permission>
  <role-name>Supervisor</role-name>
  <method>
    <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
    <method-intf>Remote</method-intf>
    <method-name>cancel</method-name>
    <method-params/>
  </method>
</method-permission>
```

As this example illustrates, permissions are defined at the level of individual methods. A method-permission element lists one or more roles using elements of type role-name and one or more EJB methods using elements of type method. An EJB method is identified by the name of its EJB component (ejb-name), the type of the interface it belongs to (method-intf, with the possible values Remote, Local, Home, and LocalHome), and the method signature (method-name and method-params). The listed roles are granted the right to execute the listed methods.

In general, the information needed to specify a comprehensive access control policy for realistic applications is quite voluminous. Even using good security administrative tools, there is the danger that developers introduce errors due to oversights or unjustified simplifications. For example, suppose a high level security policy states that a role is granted the permission to read the state of a particular component. At the implementation level, this requires granting the role access to all read methods of the attributes and associations of the component, defining one method-permission element containing one method element for each of these read methods. To save time, a developer might simply define just one method permission that grants the role full access to all methods of the EJB (which can be achieved using the wild-card “\*” as the method-name). The example discussed in Section 10 gives some insight into the magnitude of this problem. Model Driven Security provides a promising solution to this problem by providing a technology for modeling security policies at a high abstraction level and automatically generating the related deployment descriptors.

In addition to declarative access control, EJB offers the possibility of enforcing access control within the business logic of components. This mechanism is called *programmatic access control* and is based on inserting Java assertions in the methods of the bean class. To support this, EJB provides interfaces for retrieving security relevant data of a caller, like his name or roles.

*Enterprise Services for .NET.* The Microsoft Enterprise Services for .NET support the development of server-side components based on the .NET platform by providing services such as distributed transactions, life cycle management, and security.




Fig. 5. Security design language schema.

The Enterprise Services support declarative and programmatic access control [Beyer 2001]. Here, programmatic access control allows one to obtain the identity of the caller of a method and to check the caller's role assignments. Declarative access control supports the configuration of access control restrictions at the level of applications, components, interfaces, and methods. To achieve this, *.NET attributes* are added to the source code of a component, to an interface, or to the *assembly descriptor* of an application. The following C# code fragment grants the role *Supervisor* the right to execute the method `cancel()`.

```
[SecurityRole("Supervisor")]
public void cancel(){...}
```

*Java Servlets.* The Java Servlet Specification [Hunter 2001] specifies an execution environment for web components, called *servlets*. A servlet is basically a Java class running in a web server that processes http requests and generates http responses. Servlets can be used to dynamically create HTML pages or to control the processing of requests in large web applications.

The execution environment, called the *servlet container*, supports both declarative and programmatic access control. For declarative access control, permissions are defined at the level of uniform resource locators (URLs) in XML deployment descriptors. Programmatic access control is used to determine the identity and the roles of a caller and to implement decisions within a servlet.

### 3. MODEL DRIVEN SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW

As explained in the introduction, we aim to close two gaps with Model Driven Security: the gap between security models and system design models, and the gap between design and implementation. We accomplish this by a model-driven development process where security is explicitly integrated into the modeling language and supported during model transformation.

Rather than developing a single language for security modeling, we propose a schema for building such languages in a modular way. The overall form of our schema is depicted in Figure 5. The schema is parameterized by three languages:

- (1) a *security modeling language* for expressing security policies;
- (2) a *system design modeling language* for constructing design models; and

- (3) a *dialect*, which provides a bridge by defining the connection points for integrating (1) with (2). For example, model elements of (2) are classified as protected resources of (1).

This schema defines a family of security design languages. By different instantiations of the three parameters, we can build different languages, tailored for expressing different kinds of designs and security policies.

In the following, we discuss these languages in more detail, as well as the model transformation process. We will focus on one particular security modeling language, which we call *SecureUML*, which is based on an extension of Role-Based Access Control. We will present this language, emphasizing the general metamodeling ideas behind it. We will later present two different system design modeling languages and different dialects.

### 3.1 Security Modeling Languages

A security modeling language is a formal language in that it has a well-defined *syntax* and *semantics*. As we intend these languages to be used for creating intuitive, readable models (e.g., visual models, like in UML), they will also be employed with a *notation* (e.g., icons, strings, or figures). To distinguish these two kinds of syntax, and following UML (cf. Section 2.2), we call the underlying syntax the *abstract syntax* and the notation the *concrete syntax*. In general, the abstract syntax is defined formally, for example, by a grammar, whereas the notation is defined informally. The translation between notation and abstract syntax is generally straightforward; we give examples in Section 4.2.

The definition of a language's syntax follows the standard approach taken in MDA, as described in Section 2.3. The abstract syntax is defined using MOF and the concrete syntax is defined by a UML profile. In Section 4 we explain this in detail. In addition, we provide a semantics for SecureUML by defining a mapping from models into order-sorted first-order relational structures. We also explain how to combine the syntax and semantics of SecureUML with those of design modeling languages.

Note that the abstract syntax and semantics of SecureUML define a modeling language for access control policies that is independent of UML and which could be combined with design modeling languages different from those of UML. However, we do make a commitment to UML when defining notation, and our use of a UML profile to define a UML notation motivates the name SecureUML.

### 3.2 System Design Languages and Dialects

Our schema is open to different system design modeling languages. This supports the common practice of using domain-specific languages to specify systems using a vocabulary suitable for formalizing the system at different levels of abstraction and from different views. We give examples of such domain-specific languages, based on UML, in Sections 5 and 8.

To make a design modeling language “security aware,” we combine it with a security modeling language by merging their vocabularies at the levels of notation and abstract syntax. But more is required: it must be possible to build expressions in the combined language that combine subexpressions from the

different languages. That is, security policies expressed in the security modeling language must be able to make statements about system resources or attributes specified in the design modeling language. It is the role of the dialect to make this connection. We will show one way of doing this using subtyping (in the object-oriented sense) to classify constructs in one language as belonging to subtypes in the other. We will provide examples of such combinations in Section 5 and Section 8.

These ideas are best understood in an example. Our security modeling language SecureUML provides a language for specifying access control policies for actions on protected resources. However, it leaves open what the protected resources are and which actions they offer to clients. These depend on the primitives for constructing models in the system design modeling language. For example, in a component-oriented modeling language, the resources might be methods that can be executed. Alternatively, in a process-oriented language, the resources might be processes with actions reflecting the ability to activate, deactivate, terminate, or resume the processes. Or, if we are modeling file systems, the protected resources might correspond to files that can be read, written, or executed. The dialect specifies how the modeling primitives of SecureUML are integrated with the primitives of the design modeling language in a way that allows the direct annotation of model elements representing protected resources with access control information. Hence it provides the missing vocabulary to formulate security policies involving these resources by defining:

- the model element types of the system design modeling language that represent protected resources;
- the actions these resource types offer and hierarchies classifying these actions; and
- the default access control policy for actions where no explicit permission is defined (i.e., whether access is allowed or denied by default).

We give examples of integrating SecureUML into different system modeling languages in Sections 5.1 and 8.1.

### 3.3 Model Transformation

Given a language that is an instance of the schema in Figure 5, we must define a transformation function that operates on models in the language. As our focus in this article is on security, we shall assume that the system design modeling language used is already equipped with a transformation function, consisting of transformation rules that define how model elements are transformed into code or system infrastructure. Our task then is to define how the additional modeling constructs, from the security modeling language, are translated into system constructs. Our aim here is neither to develop nor to generate new kinds of security architectures, but rather to capitalize on the existing security mechanisms of the target component architecture and to automatically generate appropriate instances of these mechanisms. Of course, for this to be successful, the modeling constructs in the security modeling language and their semantics should be designed with an eye open to the class of architectures and security mechanisms that will later be part of the target platforms.

We require that a transformation function respects the semantics of the security modeling language: the transformation function must be *semantic preserving*. Also, we require that the new and adapted transformation rules do not “break” the existing rules. Intuitively, this means that the system behavior should not be changed, except where it is mandated by the semantics of the security modeling language. In the case of SecureUML, where we expect the system to have a state-transition semantics (see Section 4.3), this can be stated more precisely. Namely, the transitions that are allowed by the SecureUML semantics must have the same effect on the system state as before adding the new transformation rules.

To judge the correctness of a transformation function requires a formal semantics for the targeted security architectures.<sup>3</sup> In our work, we model the targeted security architectures at a high level of abstraction. Basically, in our model, system execution is abstracted to a sequence of attempts to perform protected actions. For every such attempt, a security monitor (1) checks the attempt against the static role and permission assignments (which are generated by the transformation function), and (2) evaluates code (again generated by the transformation function) that must return the Boolean true to allow the action. *Correctness* of the transformation function means that the security monitor allows an action if and only if the action is allowed according to the semantics of the security design language. If desired, this high-level notion of correctness could be refined and could be used to provide a basis for a fully verified mapping. However, this would involve, among other things, showing that the security monitor behaves as specified (e.g., according to the EJB specification) and that the evaluation of code at runtime also behaves “as expected.” We will not pursue this further as it is outside the scope of this article. Instead, we will sketch a proof, based on this simplified model, of the correctness of the transformation process using the example of the EJB platform (cf. Section 6.3).

We will illustrate the transformation process using SecureUML. We will define transformations that generate security infrastructures for platforms that support RBAC and programmatic access control. Specifically, we will give examples of transformation functions that translate models defined with the design modeling language *ComponentUML* (described in Section 5) into secure, executable systems for the component platforms EJB (Section 6) and .NET (Section 7) and a transformation function that translates models given in the design modeling language *ControllerUML* (defined in Section 8) into secure web applications based on the Java Servlet standard (Section 8.5).

### 3.4 Methodology

Our methodology consists of the activities carried out in two different kinds of processes. To start with, there are activities for developing security design modeling languages and accompanying tools. These activities are carried out in a *tool development process*. The results of this process are used by software

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<sup>3</sup>Unfortunately, most such architectures are not formally specified, so a rigorous correctness proof would also involve formalizing their behavior.




Fig. 6. The roles and activities in the tool development process.




Fig. 7. The roles and activities in the system development process.

engineers in a *system development process* to design and implement secure systems.

*The Tool Development Process.* The UML use case diagram in Figure 6 shows the roles and activities of the tool development process. The security architect is someone knowledgeable about security and additionally has some understanding of UML and metamodeling. In contrast, a system architect should understand metamodeling techniques as well as the system domain. The responsibilities of the security and the system architects are depicted in Figure 6.

Note that these activities need only be carried out once for a particular security and system design language. The same holds for defining and implementing the transformation function. The languages and tools can then be used by software engineers to model and construct a wide class of systems in the application domain.

*The System Development Process.* The system development process is characterized by the roles and activities presented in Figure 7. The difference from a standard model driven development process lies in the modeling languages used for modeling the system. Here the software engineers use modeling languages that are equipped with a vocabulary for specifying security properties of the system and the generators used to transform models into systems also create security architectures. Hence software engineers only need to understand the concepts in the UML-based security design language. They need not have expertise in the target technology or even understand how the concepts are realized there.






Fig. 8. SecureUML metamodel.

## 4. SecureUML

We now define the abstract syntax, concrete syntax, and semantics of SecureUML. While we will later give examples of how to combine SecureUML syntactically with different design modeling languages, we describe here the semantic foundations for this combination.

### 4.1 Abstract Syntax

Figure 8 presents the metamodel that defines the abstract syntax of SecureUML. The language is based on RBAC, which we extend in several directions. The left-hand part of the diagram essentially formalizes RBAC, where we extend *Users* by *Groups* and formalize the assignment of users and groups to roles by using their common supertype *Subject*. The right-hand part of the diagram factors permissions into the ability to carry out *actions* on *resources*. Permissions may be constrained to hold only in certain system states by *authorization constraints*. Additionally, we introduce hierarchies not only on roles (which is standard for RBAC), but also on actions.

Let us now examine these types and associations in more detail. *Subject* is the base type of all users and groups in a system. It is an abstract type (type names in *italic font* in class diagrams represent abstract types), which means that it cannot be instantiated directly: each subject is either a user or a group. A *User* represents a system entity, like a person or a process, whereas a *Group* names a set of users and groups. Subjects are assigned to groups by the aggregation *SubjectGroup*, which represents an ordering relation over subjects. Subjects are assigned to roles by the association *SubjectAssignment*.

A *Role* represents a job and bundles all privileges needed to carry out the job. A *Permission* grants roles access to one or more actions, where the actions are assigned by the association *ActionAssignment* and the entitled roles are denoted by the association *PermissionAssignment*. Due to the cardinality constraints on these associations, a permission must be assigned to at least one role and action. Roles can be ordered hierarchically, which is denoted by the aggregation *RoleHierarchy*, with the intuition that the role at the part end of the association inherits all the privileges of the aggregate.

An `AuthorizationConstraint` is a logical predicate that is attached to a permission by the association `ConstraintAssignment` and makes the permission's validity a function of the system state, for example, dependent on the current time or attribute values. Consider a policy stating that an employee is allowed to withdraw money from a company account provided the amount is less than \$5,000. Such a policy could be formalized by giving a permission to a role `Employee` for the method `withdraw`, restricted by an authorization constraint on the parameter `amount` of this method. Such constraints are given by OCL expressions, where the system model determines the vocabulary (classes and methods) that can be used, extended by the additional symbol caller, which represents the name of the user on whose behalf an action is performed.

`Resource` is the base class of all model elements in the system modeling language that represent protected resources. The possible operations on these resources are represented by the class `Action`. Each resource offers one or more actions and each action belongs to exactly one resource, which is denoted by the composite aggregation `ResourceAction`. We differentiate between two categories of actions formalized by the action subtypes `AtomicAction` and `CompositeAction`. Atomic actions are low-level actions that can be directly mapped to actions of the target platform, for example, the action *execute* of a method. In contrast, composite actions are high-level actions that may not have direct counterparts on the target platform. Composite actions are ordered in an `ActionHierarchy` and are used to group actions.

As we will see, the semantics of a permission defined on a composite action is that the right to perform the action implies the right to perform any one of the (transitively) contained subordinated actions. This semantics yields a simple basis for defining high-level actions. Suppose that a security policy grants a role the permission to “read” an entity. Using an action hierarchy, we can formalize this by stating that such a permission includes the permission to read the value of every entity attribute and to execute every side-effect free method of the entity. Action hierarchies also simplify the development of generation rules since it is sufficient to define these rules only for the atomic actions.

Together, the types `Resource` and `Action` formalize a generic resource model that serves as a foundation for combining SecureUML with different system modeling languages. The concrete resource types, their actions, and the action hierarchy are defined as part of a SecureUML dialect.

## 4.2 Concrete Syntax

SecureUML's concrete syntax is based on UML. To achieve this, we define a UML profile that formalizes the modeling notation of SecureUML using stereotypes and tagged values. In this section, we will introduce the modeling notation and explain how models in concrete syntax are transformed into abstract syntax.

Table I gives an overview of the mapping between elements of the SecureUML metamodel and UML types. Note that a permission, its associations to other elements, and its optional authorization constraint are represented by a single UML association class. Also note that the profile does not define an

Table I. Mapping Between SecureUML Concrete and Abstract Syntax

UML Metamodel Type and Stereotype	SecureUML Metamodel Type
Class <code>&lt;&lt;User&gt;&gt;</code>	User
Class <code>&lt;&lt;Group&gt;&gt;</code>	Group
Dependency <code>&lt;&lt;SubjectGroup&gt;&gt;</code>	SubjectGroup
Dependency <code>&lt;&lt;SubjectAssignment&gt;&gt;</code>	SubjectAssignment
Class <code>&lt;&lt;Role&gt;&gt;</code>	Role
Generalization between classes with stereotype <code>&lt;&lt;Role&gt;&gt;</code>	RoleHierarchy
AssociationClass <code>&lt;&lt;Permission&gt;&gt;</code>	Permission, PermissionAssignment, ActionAssignment, AuthorizationConstraint, and ConstraintAssignment




Fig. 9. Example of the concrete syntax of SecureUML.

encoding for all SecureUML elements. For example, the notation for defining *resources* is left open and must be defined by the dialect. Also, no representation for *subjects* is given because *Subject* is an abstract type.

We now illustrate the concrete syntax and the mapping to abstract syntax with the example given in Figure 9, which formalizes the second part of the security policy introduced in Section 2.1: only the owner of a meeting may change meeting data and cancel or delete the meeting.

In the SecureUML profile, a role is represented by a UML class with the stereotype `<<Role>>` and an inheritance relationship between two roles is defined using a UML generalization relationship. The role referenced by the arrowhead of the generalization relationship is considered to be the superrole of the role referenced by the tail, and the subrole inherits all access rights of the superrole. Hence, the subrole is the larger role in RBAC terms. In our example, we define the two roles *User* and *Supervisor*. Moreover, we define *Supervisor* as a subrole of *User*.

Users are defined as UML classes with the stereotype `<<User>>`. The assignment of a subject to a role is defined as a dependency with the stereotype `<<SubjectAssignment>>`, where the role is associated with the arrowhead of the dependency. In our example, we define the users *Alice* and *Bob*, and formalize that *Alice* is assigned to the role *Supervisor*, whereas *Bob* has the role *User*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>SecureUML supports users, groups, and their role assignment. This can be used, e.g., to analyze the security-related behavior of an application. In general, user administration will not be performed using UML models, but rather using administration tools provided by the target

The right-hand part of Figure 9 specifies a permission on a protected resource. Specifying this is only possible after combining SecureUML with an appropriate design modeling language. The concrete syntax of SecureUML is generic in that every UML model element type can represent a protected resource. Examples are classes, attributes, and methods, as well as state machines and states. A SecureUML dialect specializes the base syntax by stipulating which elements of the system design language represent protected resource, and defines the mapping between the UML representation of these elements and the resource types in the abstract syntax of the dialect. For this example, we employ a dialect (explained in Section 5.1) that formalizes that UML classes with the stereotype `<<Entity>>` are protected resources possessing the actions *update* and *delete*. Here, the class `Meeting` is a protected resource.

A permission, along with its relations to roles (`PermissionAssignment`) and actions (`ActionAssignment`), is defined in a single UML model element, namely an association class with the stereotype `<<Permission>>`. We have chosen this representation as it is concise. Moreover, it always satisfies the cardinality constraints on permissions since an association class will be deleted when one of the referenced classes is removed from the model. The association class connects a role with a UML class representing a protected resource, which is designated as the *root resource* of the permission. The actions that such a permission refers to may be actions on the root resource or on subresources of the root resource. In our example, the class `Meeting` is the root resource of the permission `Owner-Meeting` granted to the role `User`.

Each attribute of the association class represents the assignment of an action to the permission (`ActionAssignment`), where the action is identified by the name of its resource and the action name. The action name is given as the attribute's type, for example "update". The resource name is stored in the tagged value identifier and references the root resource or one of its subresources. The format of the identifier depends on the type of the referenced resource and is determined by the stereotype of the attribute.

The stereotypes for action references and the naming conventions for identifiers are defined as part of the dialect. As a general rule, the resource identifier is always specified relative to the root resource. This prevents redundant information in the model and inconsistencies when the root resource's name is changed. For example, the attribute `start` would be referenced by the string "start" and the root resource itself would be referenced by an empty string. Note that the name of the action reference attribute has only an illustrative meaning. We generally use names that provide information about the referenced resource. In our example, the attribute of type "update" with the stereotype `<<EntityAction>>` and the name "Meeting" denotes the action *update* on the class `Meeting`. As we will later see in Table II, the permission to *update* an `Entity` also comprises the permission to *execute* any non-side-effect free method of the `Entity`, for example the method `cancel()` of the class `Meeting`. The second attribute in our example denotes the action *delete* on the class `Meeting`. Together, these two

---

platform at deployment time. Note too that the reader should not confuse the `<<Role>>` `User` with the SecureUML type `<<User>>`.

attributes specify the permission to update (which includes canceling) and delete a meeting.

Each authorization constraint is stored as an OCL expression in the tagged value constraint of the permission that it constrains. To improve the readability of a model, we attach a text note with the constraint expression to the permission's association class. In our example, the permission `UserMeeting` is constrained by the authorization constraint

```
caller.name = self.owner.name,
```

which restricts the permission to update and delete a meeting to the owner of the meeting.

### 4.3 Semantics

*The General Idea.* SecureUML formalizes access control decisions that depend on two kinds of information.

- (1) Declarative access control decisions that depend on static information, namely the assignments of users and permissions to roles, which we designate as an *RBAC configuration*.
- (2) Programmatic access control decisions that depend on dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of authorization constraints in the current system state.

While formalizing the semantics of RBAC configurations is straightforward, formalizing the satisfaction of authorization constraints in system states is not. This is mainly because what constitutes a system state is defined by the design modeling language, and not by SecureUML. Since the semantics of SecureUML depends on the set of states, we parameterize the SecureUML semantics by this set. Also, we have to define the semantics of RBAC configurations in a way that supports its combination with the semantics of authorization constraints.

The basic ideas are as follows. To formalize (1), declarative access control decisions, we represent an RBAC configuration as a first-order structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$ , and we define the semantics of declarative access control decisions by  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC} \models \phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$ , where  $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$  formalizes the requirement that the user  $u$  is “in the right role” to perform the action  $a$ .

To formalize (2), we represent system states  $st$  by (corresponding) first-order structures  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$ , and authorization constraints as first-order formulas  $\phi_{ST}^p(u)$  (independent of the state  $st$ ). In accordance with the SecureUML metamodel, constraints are associated with permissions (not actions), and this formula formalizes under which condition the user  $u$  has the permission  $p$ . Whether or not this condition holds in the state  $st$  is then cast as the logical decision problem  $\mathfrak{S}_{st} \models \phi_{ST}^p(u)$ .

To combine both RBAC configurations and authorization constraints, we combine the first-order structures  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$  and  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$ , as well as the first-order formulas  $\phi_{ST}^p(u)$  and  $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$ , and use this to formalize the semantics of individual access control decisions. Roughly speaking, the combined semantics is defined by  $\langle \mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{st} \rangle \models \phi_{AC}(u, a)$ , where  $\phi_{AC}(u, a)$  is built from both  $\phi_{ST}^p(u)$

and  $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$ , and  $\langle \mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{st} \rangle$  denotes the “union” of the structures  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$  and  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$ . Since the addition of access control changes the run-time behavior of a system, we must also define how the semantics of SecureUML models affects the system behavior specified by design models specified in design modeling languages. To accomplish this, we require that the system behavior can be defined by a transition system, and we interpret the addition of access control as restricting the system behavior by removing transitions from this transition system. In what follows, we formalize these ideas more precisely.

*Declarative Access Control.* To begin with, we define an order-sorted signature  $\Sigma_{RBAC} = (S_{RBAC}, \leq_{RBAC}, \mathcal{F}_{RBAC}, \mathcal{P}_{RBAC})$ , which defines the type of structures that specify role-based access control configurations.<sup>5</sup> Here  $S_{RBAC}$  is a set of sorts,  $\leq_{RBAC}$  is a partial order on  $S_{RBAC}$ ,  $\mathcal{F}_{RBAC}$  is a sorted set of function symbols, and  $\mathcal{P}_{RBAC}$  is a sorted set of predicate symbols. In detail, we define

$$S_{RBAC} = \{ Users, Subjects, Roles, Permissions, AtomicActions, Actions \},$$

where  $Users \leq_{RBAC} Subjects$ , and  $AtomicActions \leq_{RBAC} Actions$ ,

$$\mathcal{F}_{RBAC} = \emptyset,$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{RBAC} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \geq_{Subjects} : Subjects \times Subjects, \quad UA : Subjects \times Roles, \\ \geq_{Roles} : Roles \times Roles, \quad PA : Roles \times Permissions, \\ \geq_{Actions} : Actions \times Actions, \quad AA : Permissions \times Actions \end{array} \right\}.$$

The subsort relation  $\leq_{RBAC}$  is used here to formalize that  $Users$  is a subsort of  $Subjects$ , and  $AtomicActions$  is a subsort of  $Actions$ .

The predicate symbols  $UA$ ,  $PA$ , and  $AA$  denote assignment relations corresponding in the SecureUML metamodel to the associations `SubjectAssignment`, `PermissionAssignment`, and `ActionAssignment` respectively. The predicate symbols  $\geq_{Subjects}$ ,  $\geq_{Roles}$ , and  $\geq_{Actions}$  denote hierarchies on the respective sets and correspond to the aggregation associations `SubjectGroup`, `RoleHierarchy`, and `ActionHierarchy` respectively.

A SecureUML model defines a  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$  in the obvious way: the sets  $Users$ ,  $Subjects$ ,  $Roles$ ,  $Permissions$ ,  $AtomicActions$ , and  $Actions$  each contain entries for every model element of the corresponding metamodel types `User`, `Subject`, `Role`, `Permission`, `AtomicAction`, and `Action`. Also, the relations  $UA$ ,  $PA$ , and  $AA$  contain tuples for each instance of the corresponding association specified in the abstract syntax of SecureUML.

Additionally, we define the partial orders  $\geq_{Subjects}$ ,  $\geq_{Roles}$ , and  $\geq_{Actions}$  on the sets of subjects, roles, and actions respectively.  $\geq_{Subjects}$  is given by the reflexive closure of the aggregation association `SubjectGroup` in Figure 8 and formalizes that a group is larger than all its contained subjects.  $\geq_{Role}$  is defined analogously, based on the aggregation association `RoleHierarchy` on `Role`, and we write subroles (roles with additional privileges) on the left (larger) side of the  $\geq$ -symbol.  $\geq_{Actions}$  is given by the reflexive closure of the composition hierarchy

<sup>5</sup>For an overview of order-sorted signatures and algebras, see Goguen and Meseguer [1992].

on actions, defined by the aggregation ActionHierarchy. We write  $a_1 \geq_{\text{Actions}} a_2$ , if  $a_2$  is a subordinated action of  $a_1$ . These relations are partial orders because aggregations in UML are transitive and antisymmetric by definition.

Note that compared to Figure 8, we have excluded the metamodel types Group, CompositeAction, Resource, and AuthorizationConstraint. Resource is excluded because the target of access control is the actions performed on resources, and not resources themselves. Group and CompositeAction are excluded because groups and composite actions are just subsets of subjects and actions respectively and do not play any further role in the semantics. AuthorizationConstraint is excluded because its semantics is not part of declarative access control, but rather part of programmatic access control.

We define the formula  $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$  with variables  $u$  of sort *Users* and  $a$  of sort *Actions* by

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_{RBAC}(u, a) = & \exists s \in \text{Subjects}, r_1, r_2 \in \text{Roles}, p \in \text{Permissions}, a' \in \text{Actions}. \\ & s \geq_{\text{Subjects}} u \wedge UA(s, r_1) \wedge r_1 \geq_{\text{Roles}} r_2 \wedge \\ & PA(r_2, p) \wedge AA(p, a') \wedge a' \geq_{\text{Actions}} a. \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, we can factor out the permissions, yielding the equivalent formulation

$$\phi_{RBAC}(u, a) = \bigvee_{p \in \text{Permissions}} \phi_{\text{User}}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{\text{Action}}(p, a), \quad (1)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_{\text{User}}(u, p) = & \exists s \in \text{Subjects}, r_1, r_2 \in \text{Roles}. \\ & s \geq_{\text{Subjects}} u \wedge UA(s, r_1) \wedge r_1 \geq_{\text{Roles}} r_2 \wedge PA(r_2, p) \end{aligned}$$

states that the user  $u$  has the permission  $p$ , and

$$\phi_{\text{Action}}(p, a) = \exists a' \in \text{Actions}. AA(p, a') \wedge a' \geq_{\text{Actions}} a$$

states that  $p$  is a permission for the action  $a$ . This is essentially a reformulation of the usual RBAC semantics (cf. Section 2.4). The reason for the factorization given by definition (1) will become clear when we combine this formula with programmatic access control formulas  $\phi_{ST}^p(u)$ .

The declarative access control part of SecureUML is now defined by saying that a user  $u$  may perform an action  $a$  only if  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC} \models \phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$  holds.

*Programmatic Access Control.* While declarative access control decisions can be made independently of the system model, we must explicitly incorporate the syntax and semantics of the design modeling language into SecureUML for programmatic access control. In order to be able to combine the semantics of SecureUML with the semantics of system design modeling languages, we make some assumptions about the nature of the latter, so that the semantic combination will be well-defined.

To make programmatic access control decisions, we require that the system design model provides a vocabulary for talking about the structure of the system. More formally, we require that the system design model provides a sorted

first-order signature  $\Sigma_{ST} = (\mathcal{S}_{ST}, \mathcal{F}_{ST}, \mathcal{P}_{ST})$ . Typically,  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$  contains one sort for each class in the system model,  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  contains a function symbol for each attribute and for each side-effect free method of the model, and  $\mathcal{P}_{ST}$  contains predicate symbols for 1-to-many and many-to-many relations between classes. How exactly this signature is defined depends on the semantics of the system design modeling language. We do however require that  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$  contains a sort *Users* and that  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  contains a constant symbol *caller* of sort *Users*, and a constant symbol *self<sub>C</sub>* for each class *C* in the system model. This amounts to the requirement that the design modeling language provides some way of talking about *who* is accessing *what*, which is a minimal requirement for any reasonable notion of access control. For practical reasons, we also assume that  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  contains a function symbol *UserName*, which maps users to a string representation of their names. How the symbols in  $\Sigma_{ST}$  are interpreted in  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$  is again defined by the system design modeling language. Here we only require that the constant symbol *self<sub>C</sub>* is interpreted by the currently accessed object, when the currently accessed object is of the sort *C*, and that the constant symbol *caller* is interpreted as the user that initiated this access.

In this setting, the state of the system at a particular time defines a  $\Sigma_{ST}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$ . Constraints on the system state  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$  can be expressed as logical formulas  $\phi_{ST}$ , whereby constraint satisfaction is just the question of whether  $\mathfrak{S}_{st} \models \phi_{ST}$  holds.<sup>6</sup>

*Combining Declarative and Programmatic Access Control.* To formalize combined declarative and programmatic access control decisions, we combine the states  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$  and  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$  into the composite structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC} = (\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{st})$ , and combine the formulas  $\phi_{ST}$  and  $\phi_{RBAC}$  into a new formula  $\phi_{AC}$ . The combined access control decision is then defined as the question of whether  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC} \models \phi_{AC}$  holds.

By  $(\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{st})$  we mean that  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC}$  is the structure that consists of the carrier sets, functions, and predicates from both  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$  and  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$ , where we identify the carrier sets of the sort *Users*, which belong to both structures. As for  $\phi_{AC}$ , in the simplest case it is just the conjunction of  $\phi_{RBAC}$  and  $\phi_{ST}$ ,  $\phi_{AC} = \phi_{RBAC} \wedge \phi_{ST}$ , stating that both the declarative and the programmatic access control must grant access.

For realistic security policies,  $\phi_{AC}$  is usually more than just the conjunction of  $\phi_{RBAC}$  and  $\phi_{ST}$ . For example, authorization constraints are not global constraints, but are attached to permissions (as can be seen in Figure 9) and hence are only relevant for the roles that have these permissions. We denote the authorization constraint that is attached to a permission *p* by  $\phi_{ST}^p$ , and require that  $\phi_{ST}^p$  is an expression in the first-order language defined by  $\Sigma_{ST}$ . In order to define the language for the combined formula  $\phi_{AC}$ , we combine the signatures  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$  and  $\Sigma_{ST}$  by taking their componentwise union.<sup>7</sup>  $\Sigma_{AC} = (\mathcal{S}_{AC}, \leq_{AC}, \mathcal{F}_{AC}, \mathcal{P}_{AC})$ , where  $\mathcal{S}_{AC} = \mathcal{S}_{RBAC} \cup \mathcal{S}_{ST}$ ,  $\leq_{AC} = \leq_{RBAC} \cup \{(x, x) \mid x \in \mathcal{S}_{ST}\}$ ,

<sup>6</sup>Recall that authorization constraints are OCL formulas. A translation from OCL constraints to first-order formulas is mostly straightforward and can be found in Beckert et al. [2002].

<sup>7</sup>Note that we are here combining a many-sorted signature and an order-sorted signature. This is sensible because every many-sorted signature is trivially order-sorted.



$\mathcal{F}_{AC} = \mathcal{F}_{RBAC} \cup \mathcal{F}_{ST}$ , and  $\mathcal{P}_{AC} = \mathcal{P}_{RBAC} \cup \mathcal{P}_{ST}$ . Here we assume that the signatures  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$  and  $\Sigma_{ST}$  are disjoint, with the exception of the sort *Users*, which belongs to both signatures. Observe that under this definition of  $\Sigma_{AC}$ ,  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC}$  is a  $\Sigma_{AC}$ -structure.

Analogously to (1), the combined access control semantics is now defined by the formula

$$\phi_{AC}(u, a) = \bigvee_{p \in \text{Permissions}} \phi_{User}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, a) \wedge \phi_{ST}^p(u). \quad (2)$$

This states that the user  $u$  must have a permission  $p$  for the action  $a$  according to the RBAC configuration and that the corresponding authorization constraint for this permission  $p$  must evaluate to *true* for the user  $u$ .

*Behavioral Semantics of Access Control.* The preceding paragraphs defined how access control decisions are made in a system state. But what is interesting in the end is how the system behaves when access control decisions are made, that is, how the system's state can evolve over time. In order to define this, we again make some minimal assumptions on the semantics of the design modeling language. Namely, we assume that the semantics of each system design modeling language can be expressed as a Labeled Transition System (LTS)  $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$ . In this LTS, the set of nodes  $Q$  consists of  $\Sigma_{ST}$ -structures, the edges are labeled with elements from a set of actions  $A$  that is a superset of *AtomicActions*, and  $\delta \subseteq Q \times A \times Q$  is the transition relation. The behavior of the system is defined by the set of traces of the LTS as is standard: a trace  $s_0 \xrightarrow{a_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} \dots$  defines a possible behavior if and only if  $(s_i, a_i, s_{i+1}) \in \delta$ , for  $0 \leq i$ .

In this setting, adding access control to the system design corresponds to deleting traces from the LTS: when an action is not permitted then the transition must not be made, and when an action is permitted, the subsequent state must be the same as before adding access control.

More formally, adding access control to a system description means transforming the LTS  $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$  to an LTS  $\Delta_{AC} = (Q_{AC}, A_{AC}, \delta_{AC})$  as follows:

- $Q_{AC}$  is defined by combining system states with RBAC configurations:  $Q_{AC} = Q_{RBAC} \times Q$ , where  $Q_{RBAC}$  denotes the universe of all finite  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$ -structures.
- $A_{AC}$  is unchanged:  $A_{AC} = A$ .
- $\delta_{AC}$  is defined by restricting  $\delta$  to the permitted transitions:

$$\delta_{AC} = \{(\langle q_{RBAC}, q \rangle, a, \langle q_{RBAC}, q' \rangle) \mid (q, a, q') \in \delta \wedge (a \in \text{AtomicActions} \rightarrow \langle q_{RBAC}, q \rangle \models \phi_{AC}(\text{caller}, a))\}.$$

Note that this definition implies that the RBAC configuration does not change during system execution. We do not address issues like run-time user administration in this work.

We will see concrete semantic combinations of SecureUML with different design modeling languages in Sections 5.3 (for ComponentUML) and in Section 8.3 (for ControllerUML).

*Summary.* Let us summarize the formal prerequisites that are required for combining languages. From the design modeling language, in order to combine it with SecureUML, we require:

- (1) a concrete syntax based on UML;
- (2) an abstract syntax based on MOF; and
- (3) a semantics with
  - a first-order signature that includes a sort *Users*, a constant symbol *caller*, and a function symbol *UserName* mapping users to (unique) strings; and
  - a transition system semantics where states are first-order structures over the signature.

The result of the combination is then a modeling language for specifying both declarative and programmatic access control restrictions.

Note that this combination schema can be generalized to support combination with other access control languages, not only RBAC-based ones like SecureUML. From the security modeling language we require:

- (1) a concrete syntax based on UML;
- (2) an abstract syntax based on MOF; and
- (3) a semantics with
  - a first-order signature that includes a sort *Users* and a sort of *Actions* that are to be protected;
  - an explicit extension point to associate authorization constraints (like the sort *Permissions* in the case of SecureUML);<sup>8</sup> and
  - access control restrictions that are expressible as first-order formulas over this signature.

## 5. AN EXAMPLE MODELING LANGUAGE: ComponentUML

In this section we give an example of a system design language, which we call ComponentUML, and present its combination with SecureUML. We also show how to model security policies using the resulting security design modeling language and we illustrate its semantics using the example introduced in Section 2.1.

ComponentUML is a simple language for modeling component-based systems. The metamodel for ComponentUML is shown in Figure 10. Elements of type Entity represent object types of a particular domain. An entity may have multiple methods and attributes, represented by elements of the types Method and Attribute respectively. Associations are used to specify relations between entities. An association is built from an Association model element and every entity participating in an association is connected to the association by an AssociationEnd.

<sup>8</sup>Even less is possible. Authorization constraints could also be added without an explicit extension point. This would result in a simple conjunction of declarative and programmatic access control formulas.




Fig. 10. ComponentUML metamodel




Fig. 11. Scheduling application.

ComponentUML uses a UML-based notation where entities are represented by UML classes with the stereotype `<<Entity>>`. Every method, attribute, or association end owned by such a class is automatically considered to be a method, attribute, or association end of the entity, so no further stereotypes are necessary.

Figure 11 shows the structural model of our scheduling application in the ComponentUML notation. Instead of classes, we now have the three entities Meeting, Person, and Room, each represented by a UML class with the stereotype `<<Entity>>`.

### 5.1 Extending the Abstract Syntax

*Merging Syntax.* As the first step towards making ComponentUML security aware, we extend its abstract syntax with the vocabulary of SecureUML by merging both metamodels. This is achieved by importing the SecureUML metamodel into the metamodel of ComponentUML. This extends ComponentUML with the SecureUML modeling constructs, for example, Role and Permission. As MOF metamodels are defined in packages, their corresponding namespaces ensure that no conflicts arise during merging.

*Identifying Protected Resources.* Second, we identify the model elements of ComponentUML representing protected resources and formalize this as part of a SecureUML dialect. To do this, we must determine which model element we wish to control access to in the resulting systems. When doing this, we must account for what can ultimately be protected by the target platform. Suppose, for




Fig. 12. SecureUML dialect for the ComponentUML metamodel.

example, we decide to interpret entity attributes as protected resources and the target platform supports access control for methods only. To protect attributes then, our transformation function must transform each modeled attribute into a private attribute and generate (and enforce access to) methods for reading and changing the value of the attribute in the generated system.

In our example, we identify the following model elements of ComponentUML as protected resources: Entity, Method, Attribute, and AssociationEnd. This identification is made by using inheritance to specify that these metatypes are subtypes of the SecureUML type Resource, as shown in Figure 12. In this way, the metatypes inherit all properties needed to define authorization policies. Additionally, we define in this figure several action classes as subtypes of the SecureUML class CompositeAction. The action composition hierarchy is then defined as part of each action’s type information, by way of OCL invariant constraints (see below) on the respective types.

*Defining Resource Actions.* In the next step, we define the set of actions that is offered by every model element type representing a protected resource. Specifically, we fix the domain of the metamodel association ResourceAction for each resource type of the dialect. Actions can be freely defined at every level of abstraction. One may choose just to leverage the actions that are present in the target security architecture, for example, the action “execute” on methods. Alternatively one may define actions at a higher level of abstraction, for example, “read” access to a component. This results in a richer, easier to use vocabulary since granting read or write access to an entity is more intuitive than giving someone the privilege to execute the methods `getBalance`, `getOwner`, and `getId`. High-level actions also lead to concise models. We usually define actions of both kinds and connect them using hierarchies.

In the metamodel, the set of actions each resource type offers is defined by the named dependencies from the resource type to action classes, as shown in Figure 12. Each dependency represents one action of the referenced action type in the context of the resource type, where the dependency name determines the

Table II. SecureUML Dialect Action Hierarchy

Composite Action Type	Subordinated Actions
EntityFullAccess	<i>create</i> , <i>read</i> , <i>update</i> , and <i>delete</i> of the entity.
EntityRead	<i>read</i> for all attributes and association ends of the entity, and <i>execute</i> for all side-effect free methods of the entity.
EntityUpdate	<i>update</i> for all attributes of the entity, <i>update</i> for all association ends of the entity, and <i>execute</i> for all non-side-effect free methods of the entity.
AttributeFullAccess	<i>read</i> and <i>update</i> of the attribute.
AssociationEndFullAccess	<i>read</i> and <i>update</i> of the association end.

name of the action. For example, the metamodel in Figure 12 formalizes that an Attribute always possesses the action *fullAccess* of type AttributeFullAccess and the actions *read* and *update* of type AtomicAction.

*Defining the Action Hierarchy.* As the final step in defining our SecureUML dialect, we define a hierarchy on actions. We do this by restricting the domain of the SecureUML association ActionHierarchy on each composite action type of the dialect by an OCL invariant. An overview of the composite actions of the SecureUML dialect for ComponentUML is given in Table II. The approach we take is shown for the action class EntityFullAccess by the following OCL expression.

```
context EntityFullAccess inv:
subordinatedActions =
  resource.actions->select(name="create" or name="read" or
                           name="update" or name="delete")
```

This expression states that the composite action EntityFullAccess is larger (a “super-action”) in the action hierarchy than the actions *create*, *read*, *update*, and *delete* of the entity the action belongs to.

Another example for the action class EntityRead is given by the OCL expression

```
context EntityRead inv:
subordinatedActions =
  resource.attributes.actions->select(name="read")
->union(resource.roles.actions->select(name="read"))
->union(resource.operations->select(isQuery).actions
        ->select(name="execute")).
```

This states that EntityRead is larger than the *read* actions of the attributes and association ends contained in the entity and the *execute* actions of all side-effect free methods of the entity. Here, the tagged value “isQuery” is used to select the side-effect free methods. Our OCL formalization of this is somewhat complex as we must use the syntax of the metamodel to select actions of the resources that are contained in the entity instance that the action belongs to.

## 5.2 Extending the Concrete Syntax

In the previous section, we have seen how the abstract syntax of ComponentUML can be augmented with syntax for security modeling by combining it

Table III. Action Reference Types for ComponentUML

Stereotype	Resource Type	Naming Convention
EntityAction	Entity	empty string
MethodAction	Method	method signature
AttributeAction	Attribute	attribute name
AssociationEndAction	AssociationEnd	association end name

with the abstract syntax of SecureUML. We extend the concrete syntax of ComponentUML analogously by importing the SecureUML notation into ComponentUML. Afterwards, we define well-formedness rules on SecureUML primitives that restrict their use to those ComponentUML elements representing protected resources. For example, the scope of a permission, which is any UML class in the SecureUML notation (see Section 4.2), is restricted to UML classes with the stereotype  $\ll\text{Entity}\gg$ . Finally, as shown in Table III, we define the action reference types for entities, attributes, methods, and association ends.

### 5.3 Extending the Semantics

Our combination schema requires that we define the semantics of ComponentUML as a labeled transition system  $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$  over a first-order signature  $\Sigma_{ST}$ . Intuitively, every entity defines a sort in the first-order signature, and every atomic action defined by the SecureUML dialect for ComponentUML (cf. Figure 12) defines an action in the labeled transition system. Side-effect free actions give rise to function and predicate symbols in the first-order signature.

To make this more precise, given a model in the ComponentUML language, we define the signature  $\Sigma_{ST} = (\mathcal{S}_{ST}, \mathcal{F}_{ST}, \mathcal{P}_{ST})$  as follows:

—Each Entity  $e$  gives rise to a sort  $S_e$  in  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$ . Additionally,  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$  contains the sorts *Users*, *String*, *Int*, *Real*, and *Boolean*:

$$\mathcal{S}_{ST} = \{S_e \mid e \text{ is an entity}\} \cup \{\textit{Users}, \textit{String}, \textit{Int}, \textit{Real}, \textit{Boolean}\}.$$

—Each side-effect free entity method  $m$  (which is marked in UML by the tagged value “isQuery” set to true) gives rise to a function symbol  $f_m$  in  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  of the corresponding type. Corresponding type here means, in particular, that we add the sort of the entity as an additional parameter: the “this-pointer” is passed as an additional argument. Each entity attribute  $at$  gives rise to a function symbol  $get_{at}$  in  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  (the “get-method”) of type  $s \rightarrow v$ , where  $s$  is the sort of the entity and  $v$  is the sort of the attribute’s type. Each association end  $ae$  with multiplicity  $\{1\}$  gives rise to a function symbol  $f_{ae}$ . Finally, we have a constant symbol  $caller$  of type *Users* and a function symbol  $UserName$  of type  $Users \rightarrow String$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{F}_{ST} = & \{f_m \mid m \text{ is an entity method}\} \cup \\ & \{get_{at} \mid at \text{ is an entity attribute}\} \cup \\ & \{self_e \mid e \text{ is an entity}\} \cup \\ & \{f_{ae} \mid ae \text{ is an association end with multiplicity } \{1\}\} \cup \\ & \{caller, UserName\}. \end{aligned}$$

- Each association end  $ae$  with a multiplicity other than  $\{1\}$  gives rise to a binary predicate symbol  $P_{ae}$  in  $\mathcal{P}_{ST}$  of the type of the involved entities:

$$\mathcal{P}_{ST} = \{P_{ae} \mid ae \text{ is an association end with multiplicity } \neq \{1\}\}.$$

We now define the labeled transition system  $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$  by:

- $Q$  is the universe of all possible system states, which is just the set of all first-order structures over the signature  $\Sigma_{ST}$  that consist of finitely many objects for each entity as well as for the sort  $Users$ , and where the interpretations of `String`, `Int`, `Real`, and `Boolean` are fixed to be the sets  $Strings$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}$ ,  $\mathbb{R}$ , and  $\{true, false\}$  respectively.

The entity sorts consist of objects that can be thought of as tuples, containing an object identifier and fields for each attribute. The attribute fields contain the object identifier of the referenced object (in case this object is of an entity sort) or a value of one of the primitive types.

- The set of actions  $A$  is defined by (cf. Figure 12):

$$\begin{aligned} A = & \textit{EntityCreateActions} \cup \textit{EntityDeleteActions} \cup \\ & \textit{MethodActions} \cup \\ & \textit{AttributeReadActions} \cup \textit{AttributeUpdateActions} \cup \\ & \textit{AssociationEndReadActions} \cup \textit{AssociationEndAddActions} \cup \\ & \textit{AssociationEndRemoveActions}, \end{aligned}$$

where, for example, `AttributeUpdateActions` is defined by:

$$\textit{AttributeUpdateActions} = \bigcup_{\{at \in \textit{Attributes}\}} \{set_{at}\} \times Q_e \times Q_{at}.$$

Here,  $Q_e$  and  $Q_{at}$  denote the universes of all possible instances of the type of the attribute's entity, and the type of the attribute respectively. For example, the action  $(set_{at}, e, v) \in \textit{AttributeUpdateActions}$  denotes the action of setting the attribute  $at$  of the entity  $e$  to the value  $v$ . The other sets of actions are defined similarly.

- The transition relation  $\delta \subseteq Q \times A \times Q$  defines the allowed transitions. The exact details of  $\delta$  will depend on the intended semantics of the methods themselves. We will just give a few examples here to illustrate the main idea. For example, for  $a \in \textit{AttributeReadActions}$ ,  $(q, a, q') \in \delta$  if and only if  $q = q'$ : In other words, reading an attribute's value does not change the system state. In contrast, setting an attribute value should be reflected in the system state: for  $a = (set_{at}, e, v) \in \textit{AttributeUpdateActions}$ ,  $(q, a, q') \in \delta$  implies  $q' \models get_{at}(e) = v$ .

It is possible to complete this account and give a full semantics of ComponentUML, but this would take us too far afield. Any completion will meet the requirements put forth in Section 4.3 and have a well-defined behavioral semantics. Specifically, the transition system  $\Delta_{AC} = (Q_{AC}, A_{AC}, \delta_{AC})$  for the combination is defined by adding  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$ -structures to the system states in  $Q$ , extending  $\delta$  to  $Q_{AC} \times A_{AC} \times Q_{AC}$ , and removing forbidden transitions. Hence,  $\delta_{AC}$  will only contain those transitions that are allowed according to the SecureUML semantics.




Fig. 13. Scheduler example with authorization policy.

#### 5.4 Modeling the Authorization Policy

We now use the combined language to formalize the security policy given in Section 2.1. We do this by adding permissions to the entity model of the scheduler application that formalize the three policy requirements. As these permissions associate roles with actions, we also employ the roles *User* and *Supervisor*, which we introduced in Section 4.2.

The first requirement states that any user may create and read meeting data. We formalize this by the permission *UserMeeting* in Figure 13, which grants the role *User* the right to perform the *create* and *read* actions on the entity *Meeting*.

We formalize the second requirement with the permission *OwnerMeeting*, which states that a meeting may only be altered or deleted by its owner. This permission grants the role *User* the privilege to perform the *update* and *delete* actions on a *Meeting*. Additionally, we restrict this permission with the authorization constraint `caller.name = self.owner.name`, which states that the name of a caller must be equal to the name of the owner of the meeting instance. Due to the definition of the action *update* (cf. Table II), this permission must hold for every change of the value of the attributes or association ends of the meeting entity as well as for invocations of the methods *notify* or *cancel*.

Finally, we formalize the third requirement with the permission *SupervisorCancel*. This gives a supervisor the permission to cancel any meeting, namely, the right to execute the methods *cancel* and *notify*.

#### 5.5 Examples of Access Control Decisions

We now illustrate the semantics by analyzing several access control decisions in the context of Figure 13. We assume that we have three users, Alice, Bob, and Jack, and that Bob is assigned the role *User* whereas Alice is assigned the role *Supervisor*. Here we assume that our dialect has the *default behavior* “access allowed” and we directly apply the semantics of SecureUML to the policy given



in the previous section. The corresponding  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}$  is<sup>9</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 Users &= Subjects = \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}, \text{Jack}\} \\
 Roles &= \{\text{User}, \text{Supervisor}\} \\
 Permissions &= \{\text{OwnerMeeting}, \text{SupervisorCancel}, \dots\} \\
 AtomicActions &= \{\text{Meeting}::\text{cancel.execute}, \dots\} \\
 Actions &= AtomicActions \cup \{\text{Meeting.update}, \dots\} \\
 UA &= \{(\text{Bob}, \text{User}), (\text{Alice}, \text{Supervisor})\} \\
 PA &= \{(\text{User}, \text{OwnerMeeting}), \\
 &\quad (\text{Supervisor}, \text{SupervisorCancel}), \dots\} \\
 AA &= \{(\text{SupervisorCancel}, \text{Meeting}::\text{cancel.execute}), \\
 &\quad (\text{OwnerMeeting}, \text{Meeting.update}), \dots\} \\
 \geq Roles &= \{(\text{Supervisor}, \text{User}), (\text{Supervisor}, \text{Supervisor}), \\
 &\quad (\text{User}, \text{User})\} \\
 \geq Actions &= \{(\text{Meeting.update}, \text{Meeting}::\text{cancel.execute}), \\
 &\quad \dots\},
 \end{aligned}$$

and the signature  $\Sigma_{ST}$ , derived from the system model, is

$$\begin{aligned}
 S &= \{\text{Meetings}, \text{Persons}, \text{Rooms}\} \cup \{\text{String}, \text{Int}, \text{Real}, \text{Bool}\} \\
 F &= \{\text{self}_{\text{Meetings}}, \dots, \text{MeetingOwner}, \text{PersonName}\} \\
 P &= \{\text{MeetingLocation}, \text{MeetingParticipants}, \dots\}.
 \end{aligned}$$

The constant symbol  $\text{self}_{\text{Meetings}}$  of sort *Meetings* denotes the currently accessed meeting. The function symbols

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{MeetingOwner} &: \text{Meetings} \rightarrow \text{Persons} \\
 \text{PersonName} &: \text{Persons} \rightarrow \text{String}
 \end{aligned}$$

represent the association end owner of the entity type Meeting and the attribute name of a person.

Now suppose that Alice wants to cancel a meeting entry owned by Jack. Suppose further that the system state is given by the first-order structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{st}$  over  $\Sigma_{ST}$ , where

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{caller}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \text{Alice} \\
 \text{Meetings}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \{\text{meeting}_{\text{Jack}}\} \\
 \text{Persons}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \{\text{alice}, \text{bob}, \text{jack}\} \\
 \text{self}_{\text{Meetings}}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \text{meeting}_{\text{Jack}} \\
 \text{MeetingOwner}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \{(\text{meeting}_{\text{Jack}}, \text{jack})\} \\
 \text{PersonName}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \{(\text{alice}, \text{"Alice"}), (\text{bob}, \text{"Bob"}), (\text{jack}, \text{"Jack"})\} \\
 \text{UserName}^{\mathfrak{S}_{st}} &= \{(\text{Alice}, \text{"Alice"}), (\text{Bob}, \text{"Bob"}), (\text{Jack}, \text{"Jack"})\}.
 \end{aligned}$$

<sup>9</sup>We denote actions by the name of their resource and the name of the action type, separated by a dot.

The formula that must be satisfied by the structure  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC} = \langle \mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{st} \rangle$  in order to grant Alice access is built according to the definition (2), given in Section 4.3:

$$\phi_{AC}(u, a) = \bigvee_{p \in \text{Permissions}} \phi_{User}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, a) \wedge \phi_{ST}^p(u).$$

As can be seen in Figure 13, Alice has the permission `SupervisorCancel` for the action `Meeting: :cancel.execute`. However, the method `cancel()` of the entity `Meeting` is a method with side-effects. Therefore, the composite action `Meeting.update` includes the action `Meeting: :cancel.execute`. Because the role `Supervisor` inherits permissions from the role `User`, Alice also has the permission `OwnerMeeting` for the action `Meeting: :cancel.execute`. No other permissions for this action exist. Hence, the formula

$$\phi_{User}(\text{Alice}, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, \text{Meeting: :cancel.execute})$$

is only true for these permissions. The constraint expression

```
caller.name = self.owner.name
```

on the permission `OwnerMeeting` is translated into the formula

$$UserName(\text{caller}) = PersonName(\text{MeetingOwner}(\text{self}_{Meetings}())),$$

and the formula for the permission `SupervisorCancel` is *true*. For all other permissions  $p$ , the formula  $\phi_{User}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, a)$  is false. Therefore the access decision is equivalent to

$$\mathfrak{S}_{AC} \models \text{true} \vee UserName(\text{caller}) = PersonName(\text{MeetingOwner}(\text{self}_{Meetings}())),$$

which is satisfied.

Alternatively, suppose that Bob tries to perform this action. The corresponding structure  $\mathfrak{S}'_{AC}$  differs from  $\mathfrak{S}_{AC}$  by the interpretation of the constant symbol `caller`, which now refers to “Bob”. Bob only has the permission `OwnerMeeting` for this action. Hence,

$$\mathfrak{S}'_{AC} \models UserName(\text{caller}) = PersonName(\text{MeetingOwner}(\text{self}_{Meetings}()))$$

is required for access. Since Jack is the owner of this meeting, not Bob, this constraint is not satisfied and access is denied.

## 6. GENERATING AN EJB SYSTEM

We now show how ComponentUML models can be transformed into executable EJB systems with configured access control infrastructures. First, we outline the basic generation rules for EJB systems and illustrate the approach using the example introduced in the previous section. Afterwards, we present the rules for transforming SecureUML elements into EJB access control information. The generation of users, roles, and user assignments is straightforward in EJB: for each user, role, and user assignment, we generate a corresponding element in the deployment descriptor. We therefore omit these details and focus here on the parts of the infrastructure responsible for enforcing permissions and authorization constraints.

## 6.1 Basic Generation Rules for EJB

Generation rules are defined for entities, their attributes, methods, and association ends. The result of the transformation is a source code fragment in the concrete syntax of the EJB platform, either Java source code or XML deployment descriptors.

An Entity is transformed to a complete EJB component of type *entity bean* with all necessary interfaces and an implementation class. Additionally, a factory method `create` for creating new component instances is generated. The component itself is defined by an entry in the deployment descriptor of type *entity* as shown by the following XML fragment.

```
<entity>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <local-home>scheduler.MeetingHome</local-home>
  <local>scheduler.Meeting</local>
  <ejb-class>scheduler.MeetingBean</ejb-class>
  ...
</entity>
```

A Method is transformed to a method declaration in the component interface of the respective entity bean and a method stub in the corresponding bean implementation class. The following shows the stub for the method `cancel` of the entity `Meeting`.

```
void cancel(){ }
```

For each Attribute, access methods for reading and writing the attribute value are generated along with persistency information that is used by the application server to determine how to store this value in a database. The declarations of the access methods for the attribute `duration` of the entity `Meeting` are shown in the following Java code fragment.

```
int getDuration();
void setDuration(int duration);
```

Elements of type `AssociationEnd` are handled analogously to attributes. Access methods are generated for reading the collection of associated objects and for adding objects to, or deleting them from, the collection. Furthermore, persistency information for storing the association-end data in a database is generated. The following code fragment shows the declarations of the access methods for the association end participants of the entity `Meeting`.

```
Collection getParticipants();
void addParticipant(Participant participant);
void removeParticipant(Participant participant);
```

## 6.2 Generating Access Control Infrastructures

We define generation rules that translate a security design model into an EJB security infrastructure based on declarative and programmatic access

control. Each permission is translated into an equivalent XML element of type `method-permission`, used in the deployment descriptor for the declarative access control of EJB. The resulting access control configuration enforces the static part of an access control policy, without considering the authorization constraints. Programmatic access control is used to enforce the authorization constraints. For each method that is restricted by at least one permission with an authorization constraint, an assertion is generated and placed at the start of the method body.

Note that since the default behavior of both the SecureUML dialect for ComponentUML and the EJB access control monitor is “access allowed,” we need not consider actions without permissions during generation.

*Generating Permissions.* As explained in Section 2.5, a method permission element names a set of roles and the set of EJB methods that the members of the roles may execute. Generating a method permission can therefore be split into two parts: generating a set of roles and assigning methods to them.

Since EJB does not support role hierarchies, both the roles directly connected to permissions in the model, as well as their subroles, are needed for generation. First, the set of roles directly connected to a permission is determined using the association `PermissionAssignment` of the SecureUML metamodel. Then, for every role in this set, all of its subroles (under the transitive closure of the relation defined by the association `RoleHierarchy`) are added to the role set. Finally, for each role in the resulting set, one `role-name` element is generated. Applying this generation procedure to the permission `OwnerMeeting` in our example results in the following two role references.

```
<role-name>User</role-name>
<role-name>Supervisor</role-name>
```

The set of method elements that is generated for each permission is computed similarly. First, for each permission, we determine the set of actions directly referenced by the permission using the association `ActionAssignment`. Then, for every action in this set, all of its subordinated actions (under the reflexive closure of the relation defined by the association `ActionHierarchy`) are added to the action set. Finally, for each atomic action in the resulting set, method elements for the corresponding EJB methods are generated. The correspondence between atomic actions and EJB methods is given in Table IV. Note that an atomic action may map to several EJB methods and therefore several method entries may need to be generated.

We illustrate this process for the permission `UserMeeting`, which references the actions `Meeting.create` and `Meeting.read`. The resulting set of atomic actions for this permission is

```
{Meeting.create, Meeting::start.read,
 Meeting::duration.read, Meeting::owner.read,
 Meeting::location.read, Meeting::participants.read},
```

where “`::`” is standard object-oriented notation, which is used here to reference the attributes and association ends of the entity `Meeting`. The action `create` of

Table IV. Atomic Action to Method Mapping for EJB

Rule #	Resource Type	Action	EJB Methods
1	Entity	create	automatically generated factory methods
2	Entity	delete	delete methods
3	Method	execute	corresponding method
4	Attribute	read	get-method of the attribute
5	Attribute	update	set-method of the attribute
6	AssociationEnd	read	get-method of the association end
7	AssociationEnd	update	add- and remove-method of the association end

```

<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>create</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>
<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>getStart</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>
<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>getDuration</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>
<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>getOwner</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>
<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>getLocation</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>
<method>
  <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
  <method-intf>Local</method-intf>
  <method-name>getParticipants</method-name>
  <method-params/>
</method>

```

Fig. 14. Generated XML code for the methods of the permission UserMeeting.

the entity Meeting remains in the set, whereas the action read is replaced by the corresponding actions for reading the attributes and the association ends of the entity Meeting. The mapping rules 1, 4, and 6 given in Table IV are applied, which results in a set of six methods: the method create, the read-methods of the attributes start and duration, and the read-methods of the association ends owner, participants, and location. The XML code generated is given in Figure 14.

*Generating Assertions.* While the generation of an assertion for each OCL constraint is a simple matter, this task is complicated by the fact that a method may have multiple (alternative) permissions, associated with different constraints and roles, where the roles in turn may be associated with subroles. Below we describe how we account for this when generating assertions.

First, given a method  $m$ , the atomic action  $a$  corresponding to the method is determined using Table IV. For example, the action corresponding to the EJB method Meeting: :cancel is the action *execute* of the method cancel of the entity Meeting in the model. Then, using this action  $a$ , the set of permissions ActionPermissions( $a$ ) that affect the execution of the method  $m$  is determined as follows: a permission is included if it is assigned to  $a$  by the association ActionAssignment or to one of the super-actions of  $a$  (under the reflexive closure of the relation defined by the association ActionHierarchy). Next, for each permission  $p$  in the resulting set ActionPermissions( $a$ ), the set PR( $p$ ) of roles assigned to  $p$  is determined, again taking into account the hierarchy on roles in the same way as in the previous section. Finally, based on this information,

an assertion is generated of the form

$$\text{if}\left(\left(\bigvee_{p \in \text{ActionPermissions}(a)} \left(\left(\bigvee_{r \in PR(p)} \text{UserRole}(r)\right) \wedge \text{Constraint}(p)\right)\right)\right) \quad (3)$$

`throw new AccessControlException("Accessdenied.");` .

This scheme is similar to the definition of  $\phi_{AC}(u, a)$  by Equation (2) in Section 4.3, as each permission represents an (alternative) authorization to execute an action. However, because the permission assignments and action assignments are known at compile time, this information is used to simplify the assertion. Instead of considering all permissions, we only consider permissions that refer to the action in question by calculating the set  $\text{ActionPermissions}(a)$ . This has the effect that the equivalent of  $\phi_{Action}(p, a)$  in Equation (2) can be omitted. Similarly, the equivalent of  $\phi_{User}$  is simplified by only considering roles that have one of these permission, which is done by calculating the sets  $PR(p)$ . If a constraint is assigned to a permission, it is evaluated afterwards. Access denial is signaled to the caller by throwing an exception.

As an example, for the method `Meeting:cancel`, we generate the following assertion.

```
if (! (ctxt.isCallerInRole("Supervisor") /* SupervisorCancel */
      || (ctxt.isCallerInRole("User")
          || ctxt.isCallerInRole("Supervisor"))
      && ctxt.getCallerPrincipal.getName().equals(getOwner())))
throw new AccessControlException("Access denied.");
```

Observe that the role assignment check  $\text{UserRole}(r)$  is translated into a Java expression of the form `ctxt.isCallerInRole(<roleName>)`. The variable `ctxt` references an object of type `javax.ejb.EJBContext`, which is used in EJB to communicate with the execution environment of a component. Here, the context object is used to check the role assignment of the current caller.

Authorization constraints are translated into equivalent Java expressions. The symbol `caller` is translated to `ctxt.getCallerPrincipal.getName()`. Access to methods, attributes, and association ends respects the rules that are applied to generate the respective counterparts of these elements, given in Section 6.1. For example, access to the value of an attribute name is translated to a call of the corresponding read method `getName`. The OCL equality operator is translated to the Java method `equals` for objects or to Java's equality operator for primitive types.

### 6.3 The Correctness of Generation

As stated in Section 3, judging the correctness of the transformation process requires a formal semantics for the target security architecture. In the following, we first give an informal semantics of the security architecture of EJB, which can be further formalized. Afterwards, we explain why systems that are generated according to the rules given above actually implement the access control policy that is defined by the semantics of SecureUML.

*Informal Semantics of The EJB Security Architecture.* In the EJB context, the protected resources are the methods of the entity beans. Each method provides the single action to “execute this method,” the collection of which forms the set of actions. Permission to perform these actions can be denied in two cases. First, if the execution of a method is restricted by at least one method permission element in the deployment descriptor, a user may only execute the method if he has one of the roles listed in one of the method permission elements protecting the method. Second, the body of methods can be prefaced by code whose evaluation determines if the execution of the method should be allowed: there can be an assertion of the form

```

if(<predicate>){
    throw new AccessControlException("Access denied.");
}

```

where <predicate> is defined by the application developer. In all remaining cases, method execution is allowed.

*Sketch of the Correctness Proof.* To argue the correctness of the generation rules with regard to an arbitrary atomic action  $a$ , we distinguish three cases:

- (1) There is no permission assigned directly to  $a$ , or to an action  $a'$  with  $a' \geq_{Actions} a$ , in the security design model.
- (2) There is at least one permission assigned to  $a$ , either directly or indirectly, in the security design model, but none of these permissions is assigned an authorization constraint.
- (3) There is at least one permission assigned to  $a$ , either directly or indirectly, in the security design model, and at least one of these permissions has been assigned an authorization constraint.

In the first case, the generation rules neither generate a method permission nor an assertion. The default behavior of the SecureUML dialect for ComponentUML is “access allowed” and the EJB container allows the execution of the relevant methods corresponding to this atomic action, which is correct.

In the second case, the formal semantics of SecureUML specifies

$$\phi_{RBAC}(u, a) = \bigvee_{p \in Permissions} \phi_{User}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, a).$$

Hence, access is allowed if and only if the user  $u$  is assigned to a role that is larger than or equal to a role that has a permission  $p$  and this permission refers to an action that is larger than or equal to the atomic action corresponding to executing this method (cf. Equation (1) in Section 4.3). As no authorization constraint is assigned, an assertion is not generated. Therefore we only need to show that a user is in a role listed in the generated method-permission elements if and only if  $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$  is true. However in the generation of these method-permission elements, both the hierarchy on roles as well as the hierarchy on actions are expanded when calculating the set of roles and the set of methods that appear in the method-permission element. This means that the method-permission that is generated for a permission  $p$ , which contains the method

corresponding to the action  $a$  (i.e.,  $\phi_{Action}(p, a)$  holds), contains a role that the user  $u$  has if and only if  $\phi_{User}(u, p)$  holds.

In the third case, it suffices to show that the predicate  $\langle \text{predicate} \rangle$  in the generated assertion evaluates to *true* if and only if  $\phi_{AC}(u, a)$  evaluates to *false*. This is equivalent to showing that

$$\bigvee_{p \in \text{ActionPermissions}(a)} \left( \left( \bigvee_{r \in \text{PR}(p)} \text{UserRole}(r) \right) \wedge \text{Constraint}(p) \right) \quad (4)$$

evaluates to *true* if and only if

$$\bigvee_{p \in \text{Permissions}} \phi_{User}(u, p) \wedge \phi_{Action}(p, a) \wedge \phi_{St}^p(u), \quad (5)$$

evaluates to *true*. However, looking at the definitions of  $\text{ActionPermissions}(a)$  and  $\text{PR}(p)$ , one sees that  $p \in \text{ActionPermissions}(a)$  corresponds to  $\phi_{Action}(p, a)$ , and that  $\bigcup_{r \in \text{PR}(p)} \text{UserRole}(r)$  corresponds to  $\phi_{User}(u, p)$ . This means that both formulas are essentially the disjunction over the same set of constraints  $\phi_{St}^p(u)$ .

## 7. GENERATING A .NET SYSTEM

One of the advantages of Model Driven Security is that by implementing different translation functions one can generate security architectures for different platforms. Here we consider generating secure applications based on the programming language C# and the Enterprise Services for .NET, described in Section 2.5. Rather than presenting this translation in detail, we focus on the main conceptual differences to the EJB translation.

An Entity of ComponentUML is transformed into a *serviced component* of the enterprise services. The generated component consists of an interface and an implementation class; a default constructor is generated as well. This is shown by the following code fragment for the entity Meeting.

```
public interface IMeetingInterface{...}
public class Meeting : ServicedComponent, IMeetingInterface
{
    public Meeting(){...}
    ...
}
```

Methods and association ends are transformed to access methods and members as described in Section 6. Attributes are handled differently; for each attribute, a C# *property* is added to the interface and the implementation class. The declaration of the property for the attribute duration of the entity Meeting is shown in the following example.

```
int duration
{
    get;
    set;
}
```



In contrast to the EJB generation, the transformation of permissions is “method-centric” because access restrictions are defined in .NET using `SecurityRole` attributes in the component source code (see Section 2.5). Such attributes must be generated for each role that is allowed to execute a method  $m$ . The set of roles  $MethodRoles(m)$  that are granted access to  $m$  is determined as follows. First, the action  $a$  corresponding to the method  $m$  is determined and the set of permissions  $ActionPermissions(a)$  is calculated according to the rules given in Section 6.2. Second, for each permission in  $ActionPermissions(a)$ , all roles referenced by the association `PermissionAssignment` and all of their subroles (under the transitive closure of the relation defined by the association `RoleHierarchy`) are added to  $MethodRoles(m)$ . For each role in  $MethodRoles(m)$ , a corresponding .NET attribute of type `SecurityRole` is generated as shown below for the method `Meeting:cancel`.

```
[SecurityRole("User")]
[SecurityRole("Supervisor")]
public void cancel() {...}
```

Note that there is no transformation rule for `SecureUML` roles because .NET does not require global role definitions. Instead, the .NET environment determines this information by analyzing the declared role checks of all the application’s components.

The transformation of authorization constraints is analogous to the EJB transformation. There are only minor syntactic differences in the mapping rules between OCL and the C# programming language and the programmatic access control functions of .NET. The following shows the counterpart of the example given in Section 6.2.

```
if (!(ctxt.IsCallerInRole("Supervisor") /* SupervisorCancel */
    || (ctxt.IsCallerInRole("User")
        || ctxt.IsCallerInRole("Supervisor"))
    && ctxt.OriginalCaller.AccountName == owner)))
    throw new UnauthorizedAccessException("Access denied.");
```

## 8. ControllerUML

To demonstrate the general applicability of our approach, we now present a second design modeling language. This language, which we call *ControllerUML*, is based on state machines.<sup>10</sup> We will show how `ControllerUML` can be integrated with `SecureUML` and used to model secure controllers for multi-tier applications, and how access control infrastructures can be generated from such controller models.

A well-established pattern for developing multi-tier applications is the Model-View-Controller pattern [Krasner and Pope 1988]. In this pattern, a controller is responsible for managing the control flow of the application and the data flow between the persistence tier (model) and the visualization tier

<sup>10</sup>To keep the account self-contained, we simplify state machines by omitting parallelism, actions on state entry and exit, and details on visualization elements.




Fig. 15. Metamodel of ControllerUML.

(view). The behavior of the controller can be formalized by using event-driven state machines and the modeling language ControllerUML utilizes UML state machines for this purpose.

The abstract syntax of ControllerUML is defined by the metamodel shown in Figure 15. Each Controller possesses a StateMachine that describes its behavior in terms of States, StateTransitions, Events, and StateMachineActions. A State may contain other states, formalized by the association StateHierarchy, and a transition between two states is defined by a StateTransition, which is triggered by the event referenced by the association end trigger. A state machine action specifies an executable statement that is performed on entities of the application model. ViewState and SubControllerState are subclasses of State. A ViewState is a state where the application interacts with humans by way of view elements like dialogs or input forms. The view elements generate events in response to user actions, for example, clicking a mouse button. These events are then processed by the controller's state machine. A SubControllerState references another controller using the association end controller. The referenced controller takes over the application's control flow when the referencing SubControllerState is activated. This supports the modular specification of controllers.

The notation of ControllerUML uses primitives from UML class diagrams and statecharts. An example of a ControllerUML model is shown in Figure 16. A Controller is represented by a UML class with the stereotype `«Controller»`. The behavior of the controller is defined by the state machine that is associated with this class. States, transitions, events, and actions are represented by their counterparts in the UML metamodel. Transitions are labeled with a string, containing a triggering event and an action to be executed during state transition, separated by a slash. We use events to name transitions in our explanations. View states and subcontroller states are labeled by the stereotypes `«ViewState»` and `«SubControllerState»`, respectively.

Figure 16 shows the design model for an interactive application that formalizes the scheduler workflow presented in Section 2.2. The controller class MainController is the top-level controller of the application and CreationController controls the creation of new meetings (details are omitted here to save space). The state machine of MainController is similar to that of Figure 4. In the state ListMeetings, a form is displayed that shows all meeting entries in the database, independent of their owner. A user can trigger different actions from




Fig. 16. Controllers for the scheduling application.

this form. It is possible to select a meeting and to execute an action on it. The selected meeting is stored in the attribute `selectedMeeting` of the controller object. An event of type `delete` triggers the execution of the action `deleteMeeting`, whereas `cancel` causes the execution of the action `cancelMeeting`. The transition `edit` causes a state transition to `EditMeeting`, where the user can change the meeting information. The action `update` on the transition `apply` propagates the changes to the database. The creation of a new meeting is triggered by an event of type `create`. In this case, the subcontroller state `CreateMeeting` is activated, which in turn activates a controller of type `CreationController`. Note that the reference from the subcontroller state `CreateMeeting` to the controller `CreationController` is not visible in the diagram. This information is stored in a tagged value of the subcontroller state.

### 8.1 Extending the Abstract Syntax

There are various ways to introduce access control into a process-oriented modeling language like `ControllerUML`. For example, one can choose whether entry to states or making transitions (or both) are protected. Each choice results in the definition of a different dialect for integrating `ControllerUML` with `SecureUML`. Here we shall proceed by focusing on the structural aspects of statecharts, which are described by the classes of the metamodel (Figure 15) and the relations between them. We identify the types `Controller`, `State`, and `StateMachineAction` as the resource types in our language since their execution or activation can be sensibly protected by checkpoints in the generated code. Figure 17 shows this identification and also defines the composite actions for the dialect and the assignment of actions to resource types.

The resource type `StateMachineAction` offers the atomic action `execute` and a state has the actions `activate` and `activateRecursive`. The action `activateRecursive` on a state is composed of the actions `activate` on the state, `execute` on all state machine actions of the outgoing transitions of the state, and the actions `activateRecursive` on all substates of the state. The corresponding OCL definition is as follows:




Fig. 17. Resource model of ControllerUML.

```

context StateActivateRecursive inv:
subordinatedActions =
  resource.actions->select(name = "activate")
  ->union(resource.outgoing->select(effect<>None).effect.actions
    ->select(name = "execute"))
  ->union(resource.substates.actions
    ->select(name = "activateRecursive"))).
  
```

This expression is built using the vocabulary defined by the ControllerUML metamodel shown in Figure 15 and the dialect definition given in Figure 17. The third line accesses the resource that the action belongs to (always a state) and selects the action with the name “activate.” The next line queries all outgoing transitions on the state and selects those transitions with an assigned state machine action (association end effect). Afterwards, for each state machine action, its (SecureUML) action with the name “execute” is selected. The last line selects all actions with the name “activateRecursive” on all substates of the state to which the action of type StateActivateRecursive belongs.

A controller possesses the actions *activate* and *activateRecursive*. The latter is a composite action that includes the action *activate* on the controller and the action *activateRecursive* for all of its states. Due to the definition of *activateRecursive* on states, this (transitively) includes all substates and all actions of the state machine.

## 8.2 Extending the Notation

First, we merge the notation of ControllerUML with SecureUML. Afterwards, we define well-formedness rules on SecureUML primitives that restrict which kinds of combined expressions are possible. We restrict how SecureUML primitives can refer to ControllerUML elements representing protected resources. For example, the scope of a permission is restricted to the UML classes with the stereotype «Controller». Finally, we define the action reference types for controllers, states, and state machine actions, as shown in Table V.

## 8.3 Extending the Semantics

We first define the semantics of ControllerUML in terms of a labeled transition system over a fixed first-order signature (cf. Section 4.3). Intuitively, every

Table V. Action Reference Types for ControllerUML

Stereotype	Resource Type	Naming Convention
ControllerAction	Controller	empty string
StateAction	State	state name
ActionAction	StatemachineAction	state name + “.” + event name

Controller defines a sort in the first-order signature and, in addition, we have a sort of states. Also, every atomic action defined in the SecureUML dialect as well as every state-transition in the ControllerUML model defines an action of the labeled transition system.

More precisely, given a model in the ControllerUML language, the corresponding signature  $\Sigma_{ST} = (\mathcal{S}_{ST}, \mathcal{F}_{ST}, \mathcal{P}_{ST})$  is defined as follows:

- Each Controller  $c$  gives rise to two sorts  $C_c$  and  $S_c$  in  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$ .  $C_c$  is the sort of the controller  $c$ , where the elements of sort  $C_c$  represent the instances of the controller  $c$ . Each user interacting with the system gives rise to such an instance.  $S_c$  is the sort of the states of the controller  $c$ , where each state of the state machine describing the behavior of the controller  $c$  gives rise to an element of sort  $S_c$ . Additionally,  $\mathcal{S}_{ST}$  contains the sorts Users, String, Int, Real, and Boolean:

$$\mathcal{S}_{ST} = \{S_c \mid c \text{ is a controller}\} \cup \{C_c \mid c \text{ is a controller}\} \cup \{\text{Users, String, Int, Real, Boolean}\}.$$

- Function symbols are defined similarly to ComponentUML. However, controllers in ControllerUML can only have attributes, but not methods. Therefore, each controller attribute  $at$  gives rise to a function symbol  $get_{at}$  in  $\mathcal{F}_{ST}$  (the “get-method”) of type  $s \rightarrow v$ , where  $s$  is the sort of the controller and  $v$  is the sort of the attribute’s type:

$$\mathcal{F}_{ST} = \{get_{at} \mid at \text{ is a controller attribute}\} \cup \{self_c \mid c \text{ is a controller}\} \cup \{caller, UserName\}.$$

The initial and current states of a controller’s state machine are denoted by the implicit (in the sense that every controller will have them) controller attributes `initialState` and `currentState` of type  $S_c$ . The initial state of a controller denotes the state that is active when the state machine starts after the controller is created, and the current state denotes the currently active state. Whereas the attributes `initialState` and `currentState` are of type  $S_c$ , other controller attributes denote application-specific data attached to the controller and can have the types String, Int, Real, and Boolean. Additionally, it is possible to combine ControllerUML with a data-oriented modeling language (like ComponentUML). Then one can use controller attributes with types provided by the data-modeling language. For example, in Figure 18 in the MainController, we refer to the entity Meeting of the ComponentUML model.

- Since there are no predicate symbols,

$$\mathcal{P}_{ST} = \emptyset.$$

The transition system  $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$  is defined as follows:




Fig. 18. Policy for the scheduling application.

- $Q$  is the universe of all possible states, which is just the set of all first-order structures over the signature  $\Sigma_{ST}$  with finitely many elements for each controller sort as well as for the sort *Users*, where the interpretations of *String*, *Int*, *Real*, *Boolean*, and  $S_c$  are fixed to be the sets *Strings*,  $\mathbb{Z}$ ,  $\mathbb{R}$ ,  $\{true, false\}$ , and the set of states of the controller  $c$  respectively.
- The set of actions  $A$  is defined by:

$$A = \text{ControllerActivateActions} \cup \text{StateActivateActions} \cup \text{StatemachineActionExecuteActions} \cup \text{StateTransitions}.$$

This means that all atomic actions (cf. Figure 17) as well as all state transitions are actions of the transition system.

- The transition relation  $\delta \subseteq Q \times A \times Q$  defines the allowed transitions. For example, one requires that for each transition  $s_1 \xrightarrow{a} s_2$  in the model there are corresponding tuples  $(s_{old}, a, s_{new})$  in  $\delta$ , where the current state of the controller (i.e., the attribute *currentState*) is  $s_1$  in  $s_{old}$  and is  $s_2$  in  $s_{new}$ . For the purposes of this article, it does not matter which particular semantics is used, for example, one of the many semantics for statechart-like languages (von der Beeck [1994] lists about 20 of them).

Having defined the semantics of ControllerUML in this way, we combine it with the semantics of SecureUML as described in Section 4.3. That is, the new transition system  $\Delta_{AC} = (Q_{AC}, A_{AC}, \delta_{AC})$  is defined by adding  $\Sigma_{RBAC}$ -structures to the system states in  $Q$ , extending  $\delta$  to  $Q_{AC} \times A_{AC} \times Q_{AC}$ , and removing the forbidden transitions from the result. Hence,  $\delta_{AC}$  will only contain those transitions that are allowed according to the SecureUML semantics.

#### 8.4 Formalizing the Authorization Policy

We now return to our scheduling application model and extend it with a formalization of the security policy given in Section 2.1. In doing so, we use the role model introduced in Section 4.2.

As Figure 18 shows, we use two permissions to formalize the first requirement that all users are allowed to create and to read all meetings. The permission `UserMain` grants the role `User` the right to activate the controller `MainController` and the states `ListMeetings` and `CreateMeeting`. The permission `UserCreation` grants the role `User` the privilege to activate the `CreationController` including the right to activate all of its states and to execute all of its actions.

The second requirement states that only the owner of a meeting entry is allowed to change or delete it. We formalize this by the permission `OwnerMeeting`, which grants the role `User` the right to execute the actions on the outgoing transitions `delete` and `cancel` of the state `ListMeetings` and the right to activate the state `EditMeeting`. This permission is restricted by the ownership constraint attached to it.

Finally, supervisors are allowed to cancel any meeting. Therefore, the permission `SupervisorCancel` grants this role the unrestricted right to execute the action `cancelMeeting` on the transition `cancel`.

#### 8.5 Transformation to Web Applications

In this section, we describe a transformation function that constructs secure web applications from `ControllerUML` models. As a starting point, we assume the existence of a transformation function that translates UML classes and state machines into controller classes for web applications, which can be executed in a Java Servlet environment (see Section 2.5). We describe here how we extend such a function to generate security infrastructures from `SecureUML` models.

The Java Servlet architecture supports RBAC; however, its URL-based authorization scheme only enforces access control when a request arrives from outside the web server. This is ill-suited for advanced web applications that are built from multiple servlets, where one acts as the central entry point for the application. This entry point servlet acts as a dispatcher in that it receives all requests and forwards them (depending on the application state) to the other servlets, which execute the business logic. The declarative authorization mechanism only provides protection for the dispatcher. To overcome this weakness, we generate access control infrastructures that exploit the programmatic access control mechanism that servlets provide, where the role assignments of a user can be retrieved by any servlet.

Our transformation function is an extension of an existing generator provided by the MDA-tool `ArcStyler` [Hubert 2001], which converts UML classes and state machines into controller classes. Each controller is equipped with methods for activating the controller, performing state transitions, activating the states of the controller, and executing actions on transitions.

We augment the existing transformation function by generation rules that operate on the abstract syntax of `SecureUML` and add Java assertions to the

methods for *process activation*, *state activation*, and *action execution* of a controller class. First, the set  $ActionPermissions(a)$ , which contains all permissions affecting the execution of an action, is determined as described in Section 6.2. Afterwards, an assertion is generated of the form:

$$\mathbf{if} \left( \left( \bigvee_{p \in ActionPermissions(a)} \left( \left( \bigvee_{r \in PR(p)} UserRole(r) \right) \wedge Constraint(p) \right) \right) \right) \quad (6)$$

`c.forward("/unauthorized.jsp");`

The rule that generates this assertion has a structure similar to rule 3 in Section 6.2, which is used to generate assertions in the stubs of EJB components. When access is denied, however, the request is now forwarded to an error page by the term `c.forward("/unauthorized.jsp")`, instead of throwing an exception. Additionally, the functions used to obtain security information differ between EJB and Java Servlet. For example, the following assertion is generated for the execution of the action `cancel` on the state `ListMeetings`.

```
if (!(request.isUserInRole("Supervisor") /* SupervisorCancel */
    || (request.isUserInRole("User")
        || request.isUserInRole("Supervisor"))
    && getSelectedMeeting().getOwner().getName().equals(
        request.getRemoteUser()))
    c.forward("/unauthorized.jsp");
```

The role check is performed using the method `isUserInRole()` on the request object and each constraint is translated into a Java expression that accesses the attributes and side-effect free methods of the controller. The symbol `caller` is translated into a call to `getRemoteUser()` on the request object.

## 9. EVALUATION, SCOPE AND RELATED WORK

### 9.1 Evaluation

We have evaluated the ideas presented in this article in an extensive case study: the model-driven development of the J2EE “Pet Store” application. Pet Store is a prototypical e-commerce application designed to demonstrate the use of the J2EE platform. It features web front-ends for shopping, administration, and order processing. The application model consists of 30 components and several front-end controllers. We have extended this model with an access control policy formalizing the principle of least privilege [Mayfield et al. 1991], where a user is given only those access rights that are necessary to perform a job. The modeled policy comprises six roles and 60 permissions, 15 of which are restricted by authorization constraints. The corresponding infrastructure is generated automatically and consists of roughly 5,000 lines of XML (overall application: 13,000) and 2,000 lines of Java source code (overall application: 20,000).

This large expansion is due to the high level of abstraction provided by the modeling language. For example, we can grant a role read access to an entity, whereas EJB only supports permissions for whole components or single methods. Therefore, a modeled permission to read the state of a component



may require the generation of many method permissions, for example, for the get-methods of all attributes. Clearly, this amount of information cannot be managed at the source code level. The low abstraction level provided by the access control mechanisms of today's middleware platforms often forces developers to take shortcuts and make compromises when implementing access control. For example, roles are assigned full access privileges even where they only require read access. As our experience shows, Model Driven Security can not only help to ease the transition from security requirements to secure applications, it also plays an important role in helping system designers to formalize and meet exact application requirements.

## 9.2 Alternative Access Control Models

We have focused in this article on a particular instance of Model Driven Security for design models combined with SecureUML. SecureUML and the generated infrastructures are based on extensions of RBAC. We believe, however, that the scope of Model Driven Security is much more general. To support this thesis, we briefly sketch here its application to two other popular access control models.

*Chinese Wall.* Chinese Wall policies [Brewer and Nash 1989] formalize the notions of conflict of interest classes and of being on the “wrong side of the wall”. In this formalism, data is organized according to the company that controls it, and the set of companies is partitioned into conflict of interest classes. An employee may access a data object of some particular company, he is on the “right side of the wall”, if he has not previously accessed data of a different company in the same conflict of interest class. Chinese Walls intuitively capture the policy that must be adhered to by a management consultant. Such a consultant should not advise companies where he has gained insider knowledge of a competitor, that is, where he has accessed data of a different company in the same conflict of interest class.

Modeling which company controls what data and the membership of companies in conflict of interest classes can, for example, be done by statically assigning data objects to companies and companies to conflict of interest classes, using associations comparable to the subject-role and user-group assignments of SecureUML. The transformation rules for such models must then generate book-keeping code that tracks which company's data a user has already accessed. The rules must also generate appropriate assertions that check whether the current caller is on the “right side of the wall.”

*Bell-LaPadula.* The main idea of Bell-LaPadula and related models [Bell and LaPadula 1976] is to classify objects by security levels and to grant subjects clearance for individual levels. The security levels are taken from a partially ordered set, for example, {unclassified, confidential, secret} where unclassified < confidential < secret, and the clearance of a subject defines which objects he can access, depending on the type of access (read, write, or append). The two primary rules of the Bell-LaPadula model are often informally summed up by the phrases that “no read up” and “no write down” are allowed. Usually, the Bell-LaPadula model also incorporates an access control matrix, which maps

subject-object pairs to allowed access types, but we ignore this here in the discussion, as this can be handled similarly to SecureUML.

Assigning security levels to data objects and subjects, as well as classifying actions into read, write, or append actions, can be done as in the case of Chinese Wall policies. The transformation rules then only have to generate assertions that check the “no read up” and “no write down” conditions.

### 9.3 Related Work

Various extensions to the core RBAC model have been presented in the literature. The need for flexible constraints on role assignments to express different kinds of high-level organizational policies, like separation of duty, is emphasized by Jaeger [1999]. A formal language to express these constraints, based on first-order logic, is, for example, proposed by Chen and Sandhu [1996]. Ahn and Sandhu [1999] develop the “RSL99 language for Role-Based Separation of Duty Constraints” and the Role-Based Constraint Language RCL2000 [Ahn and Sandhu 2000]. Ahn and Shin [2001] show how these constraints can be expressed using OCL. In contrast to these works, we use authorization constraints as additional restrictions on the permissions that a role has. As a result, SecureUML can (unlike RBAC) be used to express access control policies that depend on the system state.

Ahn and Shin [2000] give a description of the static, functional, and dynamic views of RBAC using UML diagrams. In contrast, our SecureUML metamodel provides a static view of our RBAC extensions. However, we can combine SecureUML with other design modeling languages and use the results to develop systems with access control infrastructures using security design models that support the formalization of different system views.

In the area of using UML for modeling security and access control, Epstein and Sandhu [1999] show how UML can be used to model RBAC-like situations, in particular the RBAC Framework for Network Enterprises (FNE). Although the authors also use a UML-based notation to express access control policies, their syntax is different from SecureUML. Furthermore, we propose an approach for integrating policy models into system design models and facilitate this by allowing the definition of authorization constraints on the system state. Also, Epstein and Sandhu [1999] do not consider the question of implementing infrastructures for enforcing access control policies, whereas we propose a generative approach.

Jürjens [2001, 2002] proposes an approach to developing secure systems using an extension of UML called UMLsec. Using UMLsec, one can annotate UML models with formally specified security requirements, like confidentiality or secure information flow. In contrast, our work focuses on a semantic basis for annotating UML models given by class or statechart diagrams with access control policies, where the semantics provides a foundation for generating implementations and for analyzing these policies.

Probably the most closely related work is the Ponder Specification Language [Damianou et al. 2001; Damianou 2002], which supports the formalization of authorization policies where rules specify which actions each subject can

perform on given targets. As in our work, Ponder supports the organization of privileges in an RBAC-like way and allows rules to be restricted by conditions expressed in a subset of OCL. Moreover, policies given in the Ponder Specification Language can directly be interpreted and enforced by a policy management platform. As an alternative, the authors propose using code generators to create infrastructures for particular access control technologies.

There are, however, important differences. To begin with, the possible actions on targets are defined in Ponder by the target's visible interface methods. Hence, the granularity of access control in Ponder is at the level of methods, whereas in our approach higher-level actions (for example, updating an object's state) can be defined using action hierarchies. Second, while Ponder is given an operational semantics, we employ a denotational semantics directly based on our RBAC extensions. Finally, and most importantly, Ponder's authorization rules refer to a hierarchy of domains in which the subjects and targets of an application are stored. In contrast, our approach integrates the security modeling language with the design modeling language, providing a joint vocabulary for building combined models. In our view, the overall security of systems benefits by building such *security design models*, which tightly integrate security policies with design models during system design, and using these as a basis for subsequent development.

## 10. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have proposed Model Driven Security as a methodology for developing secure systems and demonstrated its application to the domain of access control. In doing so, we have developed a number of new ideas including: the use of object-oriented metamodels and dialects for formalizing and combining modeling languages; the modeling language SecureUML for specifying access control policies, which constitutes a substantial extension of RBAC; and techniques for generating platform-specific access control infrastructures. We have given examples of language combinations that illustrate our methodology as well as its application.

There are a number of promising directions for future work. To begin with, the languages we have presented constitute three different, representative examples of security and design modeling languages. There are many questions remaining on how to design such languages and how to specialize them for particular modeling domains. On the security modeling side, one could enrich SecureUML with primitives for modeling other security aspects, like digital signatures or auditing. On the design modeling side, one could explore other design modeling languages, for example, other UML diagram types (like use case diagrams or sequence diagrams), which would support modeling different views of systems at different levels of abstraction. What is attractive here is that our use of dialects to join languages provides a way of decomposing language design so that these problems can be tackled independently.

We believe that Model Driven Security has an important role to play not only in the design of systems but also in their analysis and certification. Our semantics provides basis for formally verifying the transformation of models to code.

Moreover, since our models are formal, we can ask questions about them and get well-defined answers, as the examples given in Section 5.5 suggest. More complex kinds of analysis should be possible too, which we will investigate in future work. Ideas here include calculating a symbolic description of those system states where an action is allowed, model checking statechart diagrams that combine dynamic behavior specifications with security policies, and verifying refinement or consistency relationships between different models.

Finally, the question remains of how Model Driven Security can be integrated into the overall system development process. For example, how can roles and protected resources be identified during requirements analysis and incorporated into different models and how can security requirements be refined during the different analysis and design phases. An initial proposal for integrating Model Driven Security into requirements analysis has been made in Lodderstedt [2003]. However, more experience carrying out large case studies is needed to answer this question.

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